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WITH MALICE TOWARD ONE?1 DEFINING 
NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS FOR
WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS INJURY UNDER
SECTION 523(A)(6)OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
THERESA J. PULLEY RADWAN*
ABSTRACT
The federal bankruptcy system strikes a balance between the
rights of debtors seeking a fresh start and the rights of creditors
seeking repayment for debt. While many areas of the Bankruptcy
Code provide examples of this balancing act, perhaps no area of
the Code embodies this balance better than discharge of debt. Dis-
charge of debt provides the fresh start for debtors on which the
bankruptcy system rests, but the Code also protects the interests
of creditors who would otherwise have their claims against the
debtor discharged.
Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge any debt for willful 
and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the prop-
erty of another entity. Clearly, this section prohibits discharge for 
debts that result from a bad act of the debtor, and serves a punitive
function by not allowing a debtor to use the bankruptcy system to
avoid debts when the debtor acted wrongfully in incurring those
1 Adaptedfrom thefamousquotation byPresidentAbraham Lincoln in his
secondinauguraladdress:
With malicetoward none, with charityforall, with firmnessin
therightasGod givesustoseetheright, letusstriveon to
finish the work we are in, to bind up the nations wounds, to 
careforhim whoshallhavebornethebattleand forhiswidow
and hisorphan, todoallwhich mayachieveand cherish ajust
andlastingpeaceamongourselvesandwith allnations.
JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETTS FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 447 (Geoffrey OBrien ed., 
18th ed. 2012)(quotingPresidentAbraham Lincoln, Second InauguralAddress
(March4, 1865)).
* © 2015, TheresaJ. PulleyRadwan, ProfessorofLaw, Stetson University
CollegeofLaw. ProfessorRadwan thanksthosewhoassisted herin completing
thisproject, includingFacultySupportServicesatStetson UniversityCollege
ofLaw andherformerresearchassistant, Christian Leger(J.D. 2012).
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debts. While the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to consider
the definition of willful and malicious injury, it has done so only 
in the context of a tort claim, leaving courts to determine the appli-
cability of § 523(a)(6) in the context of breach of contract claims.
This article merges traditional tort doctrine regarding levels of
intent to harm, traditional contract doctrine of efficient breach, and
modern developments recognizing punitive damages in contract ac-
tions to conclude that § 523(a)(6) should permit nondischargeability
of intentional breaches of contract that lack business justification.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Jam esSandersfiledforbankruptcyprotection in the
Western DistrictofOklahom a.2 Like alldebtorsin bankruptcy
cases, Mr. Sandersbroughtwith him claimsofcreditors3:credi-
torswhohopedtobepaidbutwhofearedthepossibilityofhaving
unpaid debtsdischarged in thebankruptcy proceedings.4 Those
creditors included Mr. Sanderss form er attorney, to whom  Mr. 
Sanders owed a debt resulting from the attorneys representation 
ofMr. Sandersin a disputewith theInternalRevenueService.5
Theattorney secured a refund ofapproxim ately$30,000 forMr.
Sanders, from which the attorney would be paid his attorneys 
fees.6 BeforetheIRS paid therefund, Mr. Sandersrevoked the
powerofattorneysothathisrefundwouldbesentdirectlytohim
andsubsequentlyrefusedtopaytheattorneyforhisservices.7 Not
onlydid theattorneysucceed in bringingforth aclaim forhisun-
paidservices, buthealsosucceededin allegingthatthepaym ent
due for his services could notbe discharged in Mr. Sanderss 
bankruptcyproceeding.8 Whatmakesthisparticularcasesonote-
worthy, even though the Tenth Circuitopinion on thiscase was
notpublished, isthatitrepresentsasm allbutgrowingtrend of
casesin which a courtdeniesdischargeduetowillfuland mali-
ciousinjuryinthecontextofabreachofcontractclaim.9
Thefederalbankruptcysystem strikesabalancebetween the
rightsofdebtorsseekingafresh startandtherightsofcreditors
seeking debtrepayment.10 WhilemanyareasoftheBankruptcy
Codeprovideexamplesofthisbalancingact, perhapsnoarea of
the Code em bodies this balance better than the discharge of
2 Sandersv. Vaughn (In re Sanders), No. 99-6396, 2000 WL 328136 at*1
(10thCir. Mar. 29, 2000).
3 11 U.S.C. §501 (2012). Foradescription ofthetypesofclaimsthatmaybe
broughtunder11 U.S.C. §501, see generally 11 U.S.C. §502 (2012).
4 11 U.S.C. §523 (2012).
5 In re Sanders, 2000 WL 328136 at*1.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at*2.
10 Fla. Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 51 (2008); 
GrupoMexicanodeDesarrollo, S.A. v. AllianceBond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308,
32931 (1999). 
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debt.11 Debtorsfile forbankruptcy protection in large measure
totakeadvantageofthedischargeofunpaid debtthattheCode
allows.12 Discharge ofdebtprovides debtors the fresh starton
which the bankruptcy system rests,13 and clearly favors the
debtors interest over the interests of creditors.14 Yet, the Code
alsoprotectstheinterestsofcreditorswhowouldotherwisehave
theirclaimsagainstthedebtordischarged.15 Thedebtorcannot
dischargeany secured portion ofdebt.16 A debtorwhoactsegre-
giously may havedischargedenied altogether.17 TheCodedenies
dischargetoserialfilersifthefilingsoccurredin closeproxim ity
toeach other.18 In addition, §523 protectsparticularcreditorsby
declaringthedebtowed tothem nondischargeable, even asother
creditors claim s are forgiven (or at least forgotten).19
Section 523 ofthe Bankruptcy Code provides for nineteen
typesofnondischargeable debts.20 These exceptions to a debtors 
11 Cohen v. delaCruz, 523 U.S. 213, 222 (1998);Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S.
279, 286 (1991).
12 In re Bateman, 515 F.3d 272, 283 (4th Cir. 2008)(callingdischargethe
holy grail for Chapter 13 debtors); In re Miller, 414 B.R. 481, 48485 (Bankr. 
W.D. Wis. 2009)(notingtheimportanceofdischargein decision tofileforbank-
ruptcyprotection).
13 Bosinger v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 510 F.3d 442, 44849 (4th Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing thatdischarge, together with the requirementto file proofs ofclaims,
givesdebtorafreshstartpost-bankruptcy).
14 In re Kosinski, 424 B.R. 599, 607 (B.A.P. 1stCir. Mar. 1, 2010)(noting
thatexceptionstodischargearenarrowlyconstrued againstthecreditorand
in the debtors favor to protect the debtors fresh start). 
15 11 U.S.C. §727 (2012).
16 See 11 U.S.C. §724(b)(2012)(providingforthedistribution ofpropertyin
which acreditorhassecuredalien in Chapter7 proceedings);11 U.S.C. §1126
(2012)(providingfortherightofanycreditorwhoseclaim isimpairedinChapter
11 to vote to acceptor notacceptthe proposed plan ofreorganization);11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(2012)(providing thatsecured creditors in Chapter 13
m ust be paid in full or given the collateral absent the debtors consent). 
17 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(7) (denying discharge for debtors who take egre-
gious actions such as hiding property, lying under oath, or ignoring court
orders);11 U.S.C. §727(a)(11)(denying dischargeforfailing tocompletere-
quiredinstructionalcourse).
18 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8)(9); 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f) (2012). 
19 11 U.S.C. §523 (2012). Section 1328(a)alsoprovidesthatm anytypesof
debtsnoteligiblefordischargeunder§523 oftheBankruptcy Codewillnot
bedischargedinaChapter13 proceeding. 11 U.S.C. §1328(a).
20 The typesofdebtsthatcannotbe discharged have more than doubled
sincetheinitialadoptionoftheBankruptcyCodein 1978:
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discharge include debtsowed to protected classesofcreditors21
and debts incurred as a result of the debtors wrongdoing.22 Thus,
the decision to render each ofthese debts nondischargeable in-
volves a policy determ ination by Congress thatthe interestof
this particular type of creditor outweighs the debtors need for a 
fresh start,23 or that the debtors bad acts require denial of that 
freshstart.24
Section 523(a)(6) excepts from  discharge any debt for willful 
andmaliciousinjurybythedebtortoanotherentityortotheprop-
erty of another entity.25 Clearly, thissection prohibitsdischarge
In 1987, justten shortyearsago, therewereten groundsfor
excepting a debtfrom dischargeunder11 U.S.C. 523. Today,
thereare18 [now 19]such exceptions, and thelistkeepsgrow-
ing. Everyspecialinterestgroup wantsCongresstocarveout
theirparticulartypeofdebtfrom discharge. Theresult?The
debtors are far from  getting a fresh start and are leaving the 
bankruptcy system stilldebt-laden. While itisunderstandable
thatcertain debtsincurredthrough willfulwrongdoingshould
be excepted from discharge in certain situations (for moral,
and publicpolicy reasons), thecurrentgrowing listofautho-
rizedexceptionsiscertainlyfarafieldofthisobjective.
D. Jean Ryan, Esq., Statementbefore the Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversightand the Courts, Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearingson
The Increase in Personal Bankruptcies and the Crisis in Consum er Credit, 
1997 WL 179432 (F.D.C.H.)(Apr. 11, 1997);see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 (1977)
(noting eight kinds of debts excepted from  discharge at tim e of adoption). 
21 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(tax obligations);§ 523(a)(5)(alimony,
childsupport);§523(a)(8)(studentloandebt).
22 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(fraud debts);§523(a)(4)(fraud in afidu-
ciarycapacity);§523(a)(9)(drivingunderinfluenceclaims). In someinstances, a
particulardebtmay be nondischargeable both because itprotects a special
creditorand becausethedebtoracted poorly. See, e.g., §523(a)(3)(discussing
failuretoincludea creditorin thebankruptcy schedules);Cohen v. dela Cruz,
523 U.S. 213, 217 (1998) (noting that debtor must be honest but unfortunate to 
enjoydischargeabilityofdebt).
23 Fora generaldiscussion ofthehistoryofbankruptcydischargelawsin
theUnitedStatesandadiscussionoftheevolutionofexceptionstodischarge-
ability, seeCharlesJordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy
Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 36769 (May 1991). 
24 United Statesv. White, 466 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2006);Field v. Mans,
157 F.3d35, 44(1stCir. 1998);Groganv. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).
25 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6). WhileChapter5 oftheBankruptcyCode, inwhich
§523(a)(6)islocated, appliestoallbankruptcyproceedings, Chapter13 hasa
morespecificruleforbankruptciesfiled underthatchapterthatsupersedes
§523(a)(6). 11 U.S.C. §103(i)(2012);11 U.S.C. §1328(a). A debtorwhosuc-
cessfullycompletesa Chapter13 bankruptcyrepaymentplan maydischarge
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for debts that result from the debtors bad acts, and thus serves a 
punitivefunction bynotallowingadebtortousethebankruptcy
system toavoid debtswhen thedebtoracted wrongfully in incur-
ring them.26 However, the m eaning of the phrase willful and 
malicious injury, and how it relates to claims originating in con-
tractlaw, causesconfusion and leavesthecaselaw m ixed asto
when the law permitsthe discharge ofdebt. Can a contractbe
breachedin awillfulandmaliciousmanner?Isawillfulandmali-
ciouscontractbreachinherentlytortious?
This Article argues thatbreaches ofcontractin which the
breaching party understands the likelihood ofdamages to the
non-breachingpartyshould serveasthebasisfor§523(a)(6)non-
dischargeabilitywhen thebreachingpartylackedeconom icjusti-
fication forthebreach becausethepolicy considerationsinherent
in nondischargeability are m etundersuch circum stances. This
Articlebeginsby considering decisionsoftheUnited StatesSu-
prem e Courtthathave considered § 523(a)(6)in the contextof
tortclaim s, and then outlinestheCircuitCourtspliton how to
apply§523(a)(6)incontractactions. Itthenconsidersthedifferent
policiesbehind tortrecovery and contractdamages, concluding
thatnew trendsallowingthetraditionaltortrem edyofpunitive
damages in contract-based actions provide supportfor nondis-
chargeabilityofwillfulandm aliciouscontractdamages.
I. THE SUPREME COURTS §523(A)(6)JURISPRUDENCE
A. Cases Under the Bankruptcy Act
The Supreme Court has had little opportunity to consider
§523(a)(6), yet its decisions in this area provide significant
guidance to the bankruptcy, district, and appellate courts. In
cases predating the modern Bankruptcy Code, the Courtconsid-
ered the Bankruptcy Acts exception to discharge of debt for lia-
bilities27 ... for willfuland m alicious injuries to the person or
injury to anothers property, despitesuch injury being willfuland malicious,
butmaynotdischargewillfulandmaliciousinjurytoanotherperson. 11 U.S.C.
§1328(a)(4).
26 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6).
27 In 1903, CongressamendedthelanguageoftheBankruptcyAct, changing
the term  judgm ents in actions to liabilities. Ham by v. St. Paul Mercury 
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property of another.28 In Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., theCourt
determinedthatconversionarisingfrom thesaleofanautom obile
belonging to the plaintiff without the plaintiffs permission 
failed to satisfy the standard for nondischargeability because,
whileatortoccurred, thetrialcourtfoundnoevidenceofmalice
in the sale.29 In a factually sim ilar case involving the sale of
securities belonging to the plaintiff, the Courtaffirm ed a non-
dischargeability determination because the debtor comm itted
the tortofconversion with sufficientmalice.30 In both cases, the
action clearly involved a tort claim conversion31 but both hold-
ingsfocused moreon theelementofmalice in makingitsdetermi-
nationratherthan ontheexistenceofatortclaim.32
Likewise, in Tinker v. Colwell, theCourtconsidered whethera
debtor could discharge liability for criminal conversation arising 
from the debtors affair with the plaintiffs wife.33 Whilelabeled
crim inal conversation, this action led to civil tortliabilityakin
toa trespass.34 TheCourtheld thatsuch action could sufficeto
establish tort-like liability for injury to the husbands m arital 
rights, and, ifalso willfuland m alicious, suffice to establish
nondischargeability.35 As in prior cases, the Court looked at
whetherthedefendant-debtoracted with malicein determ ining
dischargeability ofthe debt.36 Butthe Tinker Courtrefused to
requireintentspecificallytoharm theplaintiffin ordertoestab-
lish nondischargeability:
Theremaybecaseswheretheact[ofhavingan affairwith a
m ans wife] has been perform ed without any particular m alice 
towardsthe husband, butwe are ofopinion that, within the
meaningoftheexception, itisnotnecessarythatthereshould
bethisparticular, and, so tospeak, personalmalevolenceto-
wardthehusband, butthattheactitselfnecessarilyimpliesthat
Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 1954)(citingBankr. Act, ch. 487, 32 Stat.
798 (1903)).
28 BankruptcyAct, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 798 §17(2)(1903).
29 Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 33132 (1934). 
30 McIntyrev. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138, 142 (1916).
31 Davis, 293 U.S. at 33132; McIntyre, 242 U.S. at139.
32 Davis, 293 U.S. at332;McIntyre, 242 U.S. at139, 142.
33 Tinkerv. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 480 (1904).
34 Id. at 48184. 
35 Id. at485.
36 Id.
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degree ofmalice which issufficientto bring the case within
theexception stated in thestatute. Theactiswillful, ofcourse,
in thesensethatitisintentionalandvoluntary, andwethink
thatitisalsom aliciouswithinthemeaningofthestatute.37
The Court continued, finding that a debtors malice is sufficient 
to establish nondischargeability when the debtor com mits a 
wrongfulact, doneintentionally, without just cause or excuse.38
WhiletheCourtdidnotrequirethatthedebtorcommitatort, but
insteadrequiredthatthedebtor com mit sim ply a wrongful act, 
thecruxoftheopinion liesin thedefinition ofm alice, notin the
typeofactcom mitted.39
EarlySupremeCourtcasesundertheBankruptcyActclearly
establishedtheprecedentthatnondischargeabilityofwillfuland
malicious acts depends m ore on the existence ofmalicious or
wrongful behavior.40 However, because each of the cases in-
volvedatortclaim, itisimpossibletodeterminewhethertheCourt
presum edthatsuchanactwouldnecessarilybeatort. Facedwith
an argum ent that a contract debt would be nondischargeable
due to willfuland maliciousbehavior, theCourtmighthaveused
the sam e analysis it used in the tort context to determ ine
whetherthe debtoracted with the requisite intentto establish
37 Id. The legislature specified the standard more clearly in enacting the
BankruptcyCodein1978:
Paragraph (5)[now (6)]providesthatdebtsforwillfulandmali-
ciousconversion orinjurybythedebtortoanotherentityorthe
property ofanotherentity are nondischargeable. Underthis
paragraph willful means deliberate or intentional. To the ex-
tentthatTinker v. Colwell ... heldthatalessstrictstandardis
intended, andtotheextentthatothercaseshavereliedon Tinker
to apply a reckless disregard standard, they are overruled. 
RevisionNotesandLegislativeReports, 11 U.S.C. §523, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2590 (1978)(internalcitationsomitted).
38 Tinker, 193 U.S. at486 (emphasisadded). TheCourtprovidedaparticu-
larlycompellingexampleofthedifferencebetween specificmaliceandmalice
under this definition: If I give a perfect stranger a blow likely to produce death, I 
doitof malice, becauseI doitintentionally and without just cause or excuse. Id.
(quotingBromagev. Prosser, 4B. & C. 247 (1825)). Whilesuch harm toacom-
pletestrangermaynotresultfrom malicespecificallytowardthatperson, few
wouldarguethatsuchharm didnotincludemaliciousbehavior.
39 Id. at475, 486.
40 See Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 33132 (1934); McIntyre 
v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138, 142 (1916);Tinker, 193 U.S. at475.
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nondischargeability;theCourtsimplydidnothavetheopportunity
tomakethatdeterm inationinthecontextofacontractclaim.
B. Cases Under the Bankruptcy Code
TheBankruptcyActwasrepealed and replaced bytheBank-
ruptcy Codein 1978.41 However, theCodeprovision mirrored the
Act, again providing nondischargeability for willful and malicious 
injury.42 The Supreme Courtagain had a few opportunitiesto
consider§ 523(a)(6)nondischargeability pursuantto the Bank-
ruptcyCode. Grogan v. Garner involvedtheburden ofproofon the
creditor seeking nondischargeability of a fraud claim under
§523(a)(2)ofthe Bankruptcy Code.43 Though itconsidered a dif-
ferentsubsection of§523, Grogan included a shortreferenceto
§ 523(a)(6): Arguably, fraud judgments in cases in which the de-
fendant did not obtain m oney, property, or services from the
plaintiffs and those judgments thatinclude punitive damages
awards are m ore appropriately governed by § 523(a)(6).44
Through dictain thecase, theCourtpresumedthat§523(a)(6)
includescertain typesoffraud judgmentsand claimseligiblefor
punitive damages.45 Fraud claims and punitive damage claim s
generallyinvolvetorts.46 Ofcourse, theCourtdidnotgoon tosay
that§523(a)(6)only includesclaimsforfraudorpunitivedamage,
41 BankruptcyCodeof1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
42 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6)(2012).
43 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 28586, 288 (1991). 
44 Id. at282 n.2 (citingRubinv. West(In re Rubin), 875 F.2d758 n.1 (1989)).
The Supreme Courtlateraddressed the question thatthe Grogan case left
open in footnote 2, whether § 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from  discharge that part of 
a judgment in excess ofthe actualvalue ofmoney or property a debtor
received by virtue of fraud. Id. In Cohen v. de la Cruz, the Supreme Court
held thattrebledamagesawarded forfraud could notbedischarged, despite
the debtors argument that nondischargeability should be limited to the 
plaintiffs losses as a result of the fraud. 523 U.S. at 223 (1998). 
45 Grogan, 498 U.S. at282 n.2. In asimilarreferenceundertheBankruptcy
Act§17, theCourttied theexception todischargeforwillfuland malicious
injuries to tort claims, holding that this section of the Act plainly indicates that 
Congress understood that under § 63a judgm ents for torts were provable 
debts, and is strongly persuasive as a construction of that section. Lewis v. 
Roberts, 267 U.S. 467, 469 (1925).
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS §908 (1977)(indicatingthatpunitive
dam ages punish [the tortfeasor] for his outrageous conduct or because of his 
evil motive or his reckless indifference); 37 AM. JUR. 2D, Fraud and Deceit,
§ 12 (2010) (indicating that fraud constitutes a willful tort). 
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but instead left open the question ofhow broadly to interpret
§523(a)(6).47
1. Kawaauhau v. Geiger
Themostdefinitivestatementfrom theSupremeCourtregard-
ing§523(a)(6)cam ein the1998 caseofKawaauhau v. Geiger.48
In Geiger, aunanimousCourtdeterminedthat§523(a)(6)nondis-
chargeability did not apply to the plaintiffs claim for medical mal-
practice.49 The debtor, Dr. Paul Geiger, treated Ms. Kawaauhaus 
foot, prescribingoralmedicationsratherthan intravenousmedi-
cationsin ordertoreducecosts.50 Healsostoppedthemedications
altogether when he believed that Ms. Kawaauhaus condition had 
improved.51 Ultimately, Ms. Kawaauhaus condition worsened, 
leading to amputation ofherfoot, and she obtained a judgment
againstDr. Geigerformedicalmalpractice.52 BecauseDr. Geiger
failedtocarrymedicalmalpracticeinsurance, heboresolerespon-
sibilityforpaymentofthejudgment.53 When Dr. Geigerfiled for
bankruptcy protection and sought to discharge the debt, Ms.
Kawaauhau responded by requesting nondischargeability ofthe
debt as a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) of the 
BankruptcyCode.54 TheBankruptcyCourtagreedthatDr. Geiger
had actedin such amannerconsistentwith §523(a)(6), declaring
the debtnondischargeable;the DistrictCourtaffirmed.55 In re-
versingthedecision ofthelowercourts, theEighth CircuitCourt
ofAppealsrequired an intentionaltortin ordertoestablish non-
dischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6).56 As the Supreme Courts deci-
sion noted, theCourtgranted certiorariin ordertoresolvea split
am ong thecircuitcourtsastothenecessity thatan intentional
tortexisttoestablish §523(a)(6)nondischargeability.57
47 Grogan, 498 U.S. at290.
48 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
49 Id. at59.
50 Id. at57.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 5960. 
54 Id. at60.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. WhiletheEighth Circuitopinion required an intentionalharm fornon-
dischargeability, both theSixth andTenth Circuitspermittednondischargeability
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Ms. Kawaauhaus argument for nondischargeabilitycentered
on the intentionality of Dr. Geigers treatm ent, and her resulting 
injuryduetoinadequatecare.58 Thus, theSuprem eCourtfaced
the issue of whether § 523(a)(6)s willful and malicious injury re-
quirementfocusedon theintenttocommittheactthatultimately
caused injury ortheintenttocausetheinjury itself.59 In deter-
miningthat§523(a)(6)required thatthedebtorintendtheinjury
in ordertoestablish nondischargeability, theCourtnotedthatthe
injury must satisfy the willful and malicious standard the Code 
doesnotprovidenondischargeabilitym erelyforwillfulandmali-
ciousacts.60 Though theCourtdid notdiscussnon-tortsituations
in itsopinion, thequestion ofothertypesofdebtdid ariseduring
oralargumentsbeforetheSupremeCourt.61 Thisdiscussion dem-
onstratedaconcernthatabroadinterpretationofwillfulandmali-
ciousinjury could affectnormalconsumerindebtednesssuch as
contract-based credit card debts. But the petitioners attorney con-
tinued to refer to a conversion a tort in his responses to the 
Court.62 Ultimately, theGeiger courtdeterm inedthatevenifDr.
upon thefindingofan intentionalact leadingtoharm. See Perkinsv. Scharffe,
817 F.2d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1987); First Natl Bank of Albuquerque v. Franklin 
(In re Franklin), 726 F.2d606, 610 (10th Cir. 1984).
58 Geiger, 523 U.S. at61.
59 Id.
60 Id. Circuitcourtsmodifiedtheirown jurisprudencein recognition ofthe
importanceofthisholding. See, e.g., Steierv. Best(In re Best), No. 03-5098,
2004 WL 1544066, at *5 (6th Cir. June 30, 2004) (Prior to Geiger we had
heldthe§523(a)(6)exception covereddebtsarisingoutofactsthatweredone
intentionallyand caused injury, withoutregard towhetherthedebtorintended
the resulting injury to the creditor. ... The Supreme Courtunanimously re-
jected that construction....); Ditto v. McCurdy, 510 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 
2007)(discussing the effectofthe Geiger decision in overruling priorNinth
Circuitprecedent).
61 Transcript of Oral Argum ent at 2021, Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 
57 (1998)(No. 97-115).
62 Id. ThefollowingdialogueoccurredbetweencounselandtheJustices:
QUESTION:Explaintomehow consumerswouldnotbehurtby
yourposition. Mostconsumerdebtisprobablycreditcard debt.
Lets assum e a consum er who has a lotofcreditcard debt
seeksa dischargein bankruptcyand thecreditcard company
comesin andsays, atatimewhen you knew you wereinsolvent
you sought additional credit. * * * Thats a willful willful act 
and therefore all of your charges, once you knew you couldnt 
pay them , are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Wouldnt that 
betheconsequence?I thinkitwould.
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Geiger intentionally provided substandard care, absentevidence
thatDr. Geigerintendedthatsuch careharm Ms. Kawaauhau, no
basisexistedfornondischargeabilityofthedebtinbankruptcy.63
Whatis clear from the Geiger courts decision is that for a 
tort claim toqualifyfornondischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6), the
tortmustqualifyasan intentional tort, with intenttoharm the
tortvictim.64 The Eighth Circuits opinion specifically required an 
intentionaltort rather than another tort form to render debt
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).65 Two factors indicate that
theSupremeCourtalsofocused on thetypeoftortneeded, rather
thantheneedforatortatall. First, in dicta, theSupremeCourt
indicated that the (a)(6) formulation triggers in the lawyers mind 
the category intentional torts, as distinguished from negligent or 
reckless torts.66 In addition, the question presented to the Su-
premeCourtprovided guidanceindicating thattheCourtlikely
intended tolimitnondischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6)tointen-
tionaltorts. Initsopinion, theCourtnotedthattheEighthCircuit
held that Section 523(a)(6)s exem ption from discharge ... is con-
fined to debts based on what the law has for generations called 
***
MR. PRESSMAN: Its a matter of what the facts are before 
thejudge. Inthatsituation, I thinkitwouldbe. ThepointI think
theamicusmadewasthatin creditcard debtin thiscountry,
ifI buyarefrigeratoratSears, I givealienonmyrefrigeratorto
Searsandtheconcern isthatpeoplewillbuyarefrigeratorand
maybegiveittotheiraunt, orsellitand2 yearslaterfileand
then find themselvesbeingcharged with committingawillful
andmaliciousconversion, astheactusedtomention, andin the
Davis case, someone who converted collateralin accordance
with an ordinarypractice, acustom thatwasagreed upon with
the lender, was found notto have acted willfully and mali-
ciously. In the exam ple given by the am icus, Id say if someone 
bought25 refrigeratorsfrom Searsand then filed bankruptcy3
dayslater, oramonth later, I think thatwouldbewillfuland
malicious, atleastifI werethejudgehearingthatevidence.
Id. Arguably, the claim in the finalhypotheticalwould be nondischargeable
under another Code section that prohibits discharge for luxury goods or ser-
vices shortly before a bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (2012). 
63 Geiger, 523 U.S. at61, 64(1998).
64 Id. at60.
65 Geigerv. Kawaauhau(In re Geiger), 113 F.3d848, 852 (8th Cir. 1997).
66 Geiger, 523 U.S. at61.
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an intentional tort[,] that [w]e granted certiorarito resolve
this conflict [between the Eighth Circuits decision and those of the 
Sixth and Tenth Circuits],67 and that the Court now affirm[s] 
the Eighth Circuits judgm ent.68 Each ofthecircuitcourtcases
referencedbytheSupremeCourtconsiderednondischargeability
in thecontextofatortclaim.69 Butthisdecision failedtoanswer
thequestion ofwhetheran intentionalbreach ofcontractcould
alsorisetothelevelofcausingwillfulandm aliciousinjury.70
II. SPLIT REGARDING NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF CONTRACTUAL
DEBTS UNDER SECTION 523(A)(6)OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Since the Geiger decision, m ostappellate courtsconsidering
whethertoallow contractclaim sasa basisfor§523(a)(6)non-
dischargeability havedischarged contractclaimslacking an asso-
ciated tortclaim , withoutconsideration ofthe intentionality of
harm.71 However, severalcircuitshavenotrenderedadecision on
thatissue,72 and some circuits pre-Geiger decisions allowing a
67 Id. at59, citingPerkinsv. Scharffe, 817 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1987);First
Natl Bank of Albuquerque v. Franklin (In re Franklin), 726 F.2d 606, 60708 
(10thCir. 1984). BothPerkins andFranklin involvedmedicalmalpracticeclaims,
likeGeiger, andthequestion ofwhetherrecklessornegligenttortactionsare
sufficienttoestablishnondischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6).
68 Geiger, 523 U.S. at60.
69 See generally In re Geiger, 113 F.3d 848;Perkins, 817 F.2d 392;see also
In re Franklin, 726 F.2dat607.
70 MichaelD. Martinez, Where Theres a Will, There Should Be a Way: 
Why In re Salvino Unjustifiably Restricts the Application of § 523(a)(6) to
Exclude Willful and Malicious Breaches of Contract, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441,
45455, 44950 (2009) (arguing that because the Geiger caseinvolved a tort,
thesestatementsonly indicatethatin situationsinvolving a tort, theCourt
required thatitincludean intentional tort leaving open the possibility that 
acontractbreachinwhich thebreachingpartyintended tocauseinjurytothe
non-breachingpartycouldsufficefornondischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6)).
71 See Steierv. Best(In re Best), No. 03-5098, 2004WL 1544066, at*6 (6th
Cir. June 30, 2004);Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1205
(9th Cir. 2001);Dowdyv. Bower(In re Bower), No. 97-1903, 1998 WL 372816,
at*2 (4thCir. June5, 1998).
72 TheFirst, Second, Third, Eleventh, Federal, and D.C. Circuitshavenot
rendered decisionson thisissue. But see In re Desmarais, 518 F. Appx 671 
(11th Cir. 2013)(quickly dismissing appealbroughton basisthat§523(a)(6)
nondischargeability did notapply tobreach ofcontractbecauseclaim involved
fraudulenttransfer, renderingtheissuemoot).
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breach of contract action to create nondischargeability remain
effective.73 Severallowercourtshavepermitted nondischargeabil-
ity forcontractbreachesintentionallyharmingthenon-breaching
party.74
A. Circuit Courts Requiring a Tort Claim to Qualify for
Section 523(a)(6)75
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals only permits nondis-
chargeability under§ 523(a)(6)when the claim includes a tort
causeofaction.76 In Petralia v. Jercich,77 thedebtorwasliableto
a formerem ployerforunpaid comm issions, having engaged in
oppression under California law.78 Jercich filed forbankruptcy
protection afterthe judgmentwasentered, and both the Bank-
ruptcy Courtand the Bankruptcy Appellate Paneldischarged
thedebtowed totheform eremployer.79 TheBankruptcy Court
foundthattheemployerhadnotproven thatthedebtorintended
to harm his formerem ployer;however, the Bankruptcy Appel-
latePanelheldthatthetortaction ofoppression mustexistsep-
aratelyfrom thebreach ofcontractaction, ratherthan beingtied
to the sam e setoffacts, to create nondischargeability.80 In re-
versing the lower courts decisions, the Ninth Circuit required a 
torttoestablish nondischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6), butitdid
not require that the tort exist independently of the contract
73 See In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at1205 (9th Cir. 2001);Diamond v. Kolcum
(In re Diamond), 285 F.3d822, 828 (9thCir. 2001).
74 See infra notes 11028 and accompanying text. 
75 See In re Bower, No. 97-1903, 1998 WL 372816 at*2 (4th Cir. June5,
1998)(unpublishedtabledecision)(vacatingdistrictcourtjudgmentrequiring
creditor to establish tort of intentionalinfliction of emotionaldistress to
establish §523(a)(6)nondischargeability becauseVirginia recognizestortfor
wrongfuldischargein sexualdiscrimination cases, allowingplaintifftoestablish
nondischargeabletortclaim withlowerburdenofproof).
76 Id. (citingIn re Akridge, 71 B.R. 151, 154(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987)).
77 238 F.3d1202 (9thCir. 2001).
78 Id. at1204.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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claim.81 TheNinth Circuitaffirm ed thistortrequirementin an-
other2001 case,82 aswellasin200783 and2008.84
In an unpublished opinion, theSixth Circuitalsorequired a
tortiousactinordertofindnondischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6).85
81 Id. at1205. Thecourtrecognizedthatin somecasesCalifornialaw might
turn a contract claim into a tort claim when defendants conduct violates a 
fundamental public policy of the state. Id. at1206 (citing Rattan v. United
Servs. AutoAssoc., 84Cal. App. 4th 715 (2000)).
82 Diamond v. Kolcum (In re Diamond), 285 F.3d 822, 828 (9th Cir. 2001).
Diamond involvedthesaleofahouseandconcealmentbythesellersofproblems
with the house. Id. at 825. The jury specifically found fraud, and that the 
defendantsintentionallycaused injurytotheplaintiffswithoutjustcauseor
excuse, and the court held that such a finding established the requirem ents 
fornondischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6). Id. at 82526. 
83 Dittov. McCurdy, 510 F.3d1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007). TheMcCurdy case
involvedmedicalmalpractice, and theNinth CircuitcitedtoGeiger in requiring
an intentionaltort, ratherthan arecklessornegligenttort, toestablish non-
dischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6). Id. However, theissueoftortversuscontract
was notconsidered in the McCurdy case. But see Hughes v. Arnold (In re
Hughes), 347 F. Appx 359, 361 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (Hughess con-
tention thatnondischargeabilityunder11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6)isconditionedon
an intentionaltort, ratherthan ageneralintention tocauseinjury, isequally
unavailing.) (citing Ditto, 510 F.3dat1078).
84 Lockerbyv. Sierra, 535 F.3d1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008). Lockerby involved
abreach ofa settlementagreement. Id. Thecourt, citingtotheGeiger decision
and severalpriordecisionsoftheNinth Circuit, noted thatin affirming the
Eighth Circuits decision, the Suprem e Court impliedly affirm ed the 
requirementofatort. Id. at1041. See also Snokev. Riso(In re Riso), 978 F.2d
1151, 115253 (9th Cir. 1992) (pre-Geiger decision denying nondischargeability
under§523(a)(6)forclaim resultingfrom failuretocomplywith rightoffirst
refusalprovision in saleagreement). See also Stoutv. Marshack(In re Stout),
2014WL 1724506, at*17 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014)(requiringtortfor§523(a)(6)
nondischargeability).
85 Steierv. Best(In re Best), No. 03-5098, 2004 WL 1544066, at*8 (6th
Cir. 2004). However, a recentdecision from the Bankruptcy Courtfor the
Western DistrictofMichigan, located within the Sixth Circuit, permitted a
finding ofwillfuland maliciousinjury on a tortiousinterference ofcontract
claim . Natl Sign & Signal v. Livingston, 422 B.R. 645, 657 (W.D. Mich. 2009). 
National Sign considered three basesfornondischargeability ofa judgm ent
by an employeragainsta formeremployeewho had used trade secretsand
clientlists post-employmentin violation ofcontractprovisions:fraud, embez-
zlement, and willfuland malicious injury. Id. at 649. The District Court
reversed the Bankruptcy Courts finding that the debt was dischargeable, finding 
that the tortious interference with a business relationship sufficed for a
findingofwillfulandmaliciousinjuryunder§523(a)(6). Id. at657. However,
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In thatcase, thedamagestotheplaintiffarosewhen thedefend-
ant-debtor breached terms of a contract for the sale of debtors 
business.86 Ultim ately, thecourtheldthatthebreach ofcontract
action could notsupporta finding ofnondischargeability.87 While
the debtorhad committed some wrongful, tort-likeactsagainst
the plaintiff, the tortious acts related to collection ofthatcon-
tractjudgmentratherthan totheoriginalcontractclaim.88 Thus,
thecontractjudgmentitselfcouldbedischarged, butanydamages
resultingfrom tortsoccurringinthecollectionprocesswouldnotbe
dischargeable if the injury qualified as willful and intentional.89
Thoughnotacircuitcourtdecision, thecaseofIn re Iberg90 pro-
videsextensivediscussion regardingtheneed fora determination
of willful and m alicious injury under § 523(a)(6). Iberg involved
a causeofaction againstthe debtor, a contractor, forfailureto
the opinion focused on the distinction between tortious interference with a
contractand tortiousinterference with a businessrelationship, ratherthan
thedistinction between a separatetortora torttied toacontractaction. Id.
at 65456. The independent tort issue m ight not have changed the courts 
opinion, however, as one can interfere with anothers contract or business 
relationshipsevenifthereisnoem ploymentcontractinvolved:
Thebasicelementswhichestablishaprimafacietortiousinter-
ferencewithabusinessrelationshiparetheexistenceofavalid
businessrelationship(notnecessarilyevidencedbytheexistence
ofavalidcontract)orexpectancy;knowledgeoftherelationship
orexpectancyonthepartoftheinterferer;anintentionalinter-
ferenceinducingorcausingabreach ortermination ofthere-
lationship orexpectancy;and resultantdamage to the party
whoserelationshiporexpectancyhasbeendisrupted.
See id. at657 (quotingN. Plumbing& Heating, Inc. v. Henderson Bros., Inc.,
268 N.W.2d296, 299 (1978))(internalquotationomitted).
86 In re Best, 2004WL 1544066, at*1 (6thCir. 2004).
87 Id. at*8.
88 Id. at*7.
89 Circuitcourtshavefollowedtheprecedentrequiringboth atortandintent
tocauseinjurytoestablish nondischargeability. See, e.g., Peklarv. Ikerd (In
re Peklar), 260 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a failure to prove 
conversion is fatal to an argum ent that defendants conduct caused willful 
and m alicious injury ... [but that it] does not m ean the converse that proof 
of conversion necessarily establishes such injury.); Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 
813, 824 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding professors breach of contract with University of 
Tennesseetoqualifyforintentionaltortofconversion, butallowingdischarge
becauseoflowercourtfindingthattheprofessoractedinnocently).
90 Prewettv. Iberg(In re Iberg), 395 B.R. 83, 9192 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2008). 
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completea new homeconstruction agreement.91 Beyond a simple
failure to comply with the deadlinesand termsofthe construc-
tion agreement, the debtorfailed tomeetbasicsafety standards,
prompting an inspectortonote that the debtors actions consti-
tuted the m ost blatant disregard for [som eones] physical safety 
andfinancialwasteI havewitnessedin myover30 yearsin this
profession.92 In addition, thedebtormisrepresented hisqualifi-
cationstothehom eownerswhen biddingforthenew homecon-
struction, including inaccurately stating thathewasa licensed
contractor.93 Asaresult, thehomeownersheld, ataminim um, a
breach ofcontractclaim againstthedebtorandthepossibilityof
a fraud action aswell.94 The courtim mediately denied nondis-
chargeability for the breach of contract claim , noting that it is a 
well-settled principle of law that a sim ple breach of contract is 
not the type of injury addressed by § 523(a)(6).95
B. Circuit Courts Permitting a Contract Action as the Basis for
Nondischargeability Under § 523(a)(6)
One could interpret Geigers intentional tort language to 
merely providean exampleofthetypeoftort action thatm ight
satisfy § 523(a)(6)s willful and malicious requirem ent, without 
m aking any indication ofthetypeofcontractaction thatm ight
suffice under § 523(a)(6).96 However, even ifone accepts this
91 Id. at86.
92 Id. at87.
93 Id. at 8788. 
94 Id. at89.
95 Id. (quoting Snoke v. Riso (In re Riso), 978 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir.
1992)). However, noting that tortious fraud may have occurred, the court
then considered whetherthe tortious conductwould suffice undera willful
and maliciousinjury standard. Id. Finding thatany tortiousconductlacked
an intent to build a house that would econom ically or physically harm  the 
homeowners, thecourtdenied nondischargeability under§523(a)(6). Id. at92.
The courtfurtherdiscussed whatone mightthink ofascontributory negli-
gence the hom eowners failure to adequately investigate a low bid from  the 
contractor. Id. at88, 92. The courtrepeatedly expressed concern thatthe
hom eowner should have conducted m ore investigation into the contractors 
qualificationswhen faced with a bid thatwassignificantly lowerthan com-
petingbids. Id.
96 Martinez, supra note70, at454(2009):
In explaining its holding, the Court sim ply stated that the 
(a)(6) form ulation triggers in the lawyers m ind the category 
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construction ofGeiger, itdoesnotindicatethatanytypeofcon-
tractaction meets the § 523(a)(6)standard. Clearly, as in the
tortcontext, theinjury from thecontractbreach would need to
beintentional.
The Tenth CircuitCourtofAppeals allowed nondischarge-
ability for a contract breach in Sanders v. Vaughn.97 Vaughn
served as Sanderss attorney in proceedings before the IRS, but 
was fired shortly before Sanders received his refund checks.98
Sandersthen refused topayVaughn;Vaughn sued and received
a judgm entagainstSanders.99 TheBankruptcy Courtheld that
Sandersacted willfullyand m aliciouslyin breachingthecontin-
gencyfeecontractwith Vaughn and granted Vaughns motion to 
deny dischargeunder§523(a)(6).100 TheDistrictCourtand the
CourtofAppeals each affirm ed, rejecting Sanderss argument 
thata breach ofcontractcould notinvoke nondischargeability
under§523(a)(6).101
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit allowed nondischargeability for
theintentionalfailuretocom plywith asettlem entagreem entin
Williams v. Intl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.102 Williams
involved a disagreement between Williamss contracting business 
and the union, which Williamss em ployees joined after being 
hired.103 ThecourtrecognizedthatWilliamsbreachedtheagree-
mentby hiring non-unionized em ployees for financialreasons,
notoutofillwilltowardtheunion.104 However, thebreach ofthe
intentional torts, as distinguished from  negligent or reckless 
torts, in order to illustrate the fact that recklessly and negli-
gently caused injuriesdonotqualify forexception todischarge
under§523(a)(6).
97 Sandersv. Vaughn (In re Sanders), No. 99-6396, 2000 WL 328136 at*2
(10thCir. Mar. 29, 2000).
98 Id. at*1.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at*1, *2.
102 William s v. Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504,
508, 512 (5th Cir. 2003). Williams post-datesthe Miller case, also from the
Fifth Circuit, creatingan apparentsplitin authoritywithin theFifth Circuit
regardingwhetheracontractclaim can serveasthebasisfor§523(a)(6)non-
dischargeability. See infra notes 15772 and accompanying text. 
103 In re Williams, 337 F.3d at 50607. 
104 Id. at510.
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collective bargaining agreement also violated an order ofthe
DistrictCourtthatapproved theagreem entaspartofsettlinga
prior legalproceeding, and the Bankruptcy Courtheld thatbe-
causethe breach also included contemptofcourt, itsatisfied the
willfuland m aliciousstandard of§523(a)(6).105 In each ofthese
cases, the court focused on the intent to harm, or at least substan-
tial certainty of harm, to the other party by the breach of contract 
toestablishthemaliciousrequirementunder§523(a)(6).106
105 Id. at512.
106 Id. at 50809; In re Sanders, 2000 WL 328136 at*2;Rescuecom Corp.
v. Khafaga (In re Khafaga), 419 B.R. 539, 549 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009);
Girardiv. Shaffer(In re Shaffer), No. 94-33189-T, 2003 WL 23138445, at*12
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003). But see Fowlerv. Jenkins(In re Jenkins), 258 B.R.
251, 26768 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001): 
In responsetotheSupremeCourtopinion in Kawaauhau, there
areseveralcircuitsthatareyetagain broadeningthescopeof
§ 523(a)(6). This Courtis acutely aware thatthe conflicting
caselaw post-Kawaauhau seekstodetermineintentionalacts
thataresubstantiallycertain tocauseinjuryshould benondis-
chargeable. However, aftera carefulreading ofKawaauhau,
thisCourtconcludesthattheSupremeCourtand §523(a)(6)
does not perm it anything less than a debtors intent to cause 
an injury. By broadening the holding ofKawaauhau, asthe
Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth CircuitCourts ofAppeals have, not
onlyjudiciallylegislateddischargeabilityissuesthatCongress
specifically limited, they alsoportrayed a judicialactivism to
overrule the Supreme Courtby attacking the issue through
the backdoor. These circuits bring intentionalacts thatare
substantiallycertain tocauseinjury, through abackdoor, per-
mitting them to be deemed nondischargeable. These are the
samedeliberateactswhich Congressand theSupremeCourt
haverepetitivelyand consistentlyheld donotsustain awillful
and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). There are many ac-
tionsthatadebtorcan takewhich willcreateadebt;someof
thoseactionswillrequirea deliberateact. Fewerofthoseac-
tionswillrisetothatofan intentionaltort;andeven fewerwill
behad with therequisiteand specificintenttoinjure. ... Itis
thoseactionswhich Congressintendstobenondischargeable.
Thisnarrow interpretation affordsadebtorthetrueintentof
a fresh start as anticipated by Congress, yet ensures that 
culpable debtors do notgain an unfettered advantage over
theircreditorsand abusethebankruptcy system asa protec-
tiveblanketforsuchculpableactions.
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Prior to the Supreme Courts decision in Geiger, theSeventh
Circuit107 denieddischargeofcontractual claim s under the will-
ful and m alicious injury standard, and the Eighth Circuit108
suggestedthatabreach ofcontractclaim maysufficefornondis-
chargeabilityin unusualcircum stances.
Severaldistrictand bankruptcy courts have also suggested
thata contractaction may sufficefor§523(a)(6)nondischarge-
abilitywhen thecourtfindsintenttoinjureconnectedtoabreach
Markowitzv. Campbell(In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d455, 46264(6th Cir. 1999);
Caton v. Trudeau (In re Caton), 157 F.3d1025, 1030 (5th Cir. 1998);Millerv.
J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d598, 606 (5thCir. 1998);Bd. ofRegents
ofUniv. ofTex. Sys. v. Walker, 142 F.3d813, 824(5thCir. 1998).
107 In acasepredatingtheGeiger decision, theSeventh Circuitaffirmed a
nondischargeability finding under§ 523(a)(6)in connection with the inten-
tionalbreach ofa contractualnon-compete clause. N.I.S. Corp. v. Hallahan
(In re Hallahan), 936 F.2d 1496, 1501 (7th Cir. 1991). Thedebtorviolated a
non-competeagreementwithhisformeremployer. Id. at 149899. The former 
employerobtained a breach ofcontractjudgmentand an injunction against
thedebtor. Id. at1499. In a relatively lengthyopinion discussing theability
to enforcethecovenantnotto com pete, the calculation ofdamages, and the
righttoajurytrialtoestablish damages, thecourtgavelittleattention tothe
issueofwhether§ 523(a)(6)could even provide fornondischargeability ofcon-
tractclaims. Id. at 150102, 1507. The court affirm ed the Bankruptcy Courts 
nondischargeability finding [b]ecause Hallahan concedes that he breached 
the contract willfully. Id. at1501. Thisresultwould changeunderthestan-
dardestablishedbyGeiger, whichrequiresnotonlyintenttoactbutalsointent
tocauseharm indoingso. Kawaauhauv. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998).
108 BarclaysAm./Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Long, 774F.2d875, 882 (8th Cir. 1985).
Thedebtorguaranteedaloan forhisbusinessbutbreachedtheguarantyagree-
ment. Id. at 876. In affirm ing the bankruptcy and district courts granting of 
discharge, theEighth Circuitheldthat:
Debtorswho willfully break security agreementsare testing
the outer bounds oftheir rightto a fresh start, butunless
they actwith m aliceby intending orfully expecting toharm
the econom icinterestsofthe creditor, such a breach ofcon-
tractdoesnot, inandofitself, precludeadischarge.
Id. at882. Thisstatementindicatesthata breach ofcontractmay serve as
thebasisfornondischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6), andprovidesforthesame
m alicious injury requirem ent that cam e from  the Geiger courtseveralyears
later. Geiger, 523 U.S. at61 (1998). Interestingly, thecourtalsonoted a line
of cases requiring that the breach of contract rise to the level of a
conversion of property in order to create nondischargeability. Long, 774
F.2dat880.
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ofcontract.109 In Girardi v. Shaffer,110 thedebtorentered intoan
agreement to purchase realproperty from the Girardis.111 The
contractrequiredthedebtortoprovidefinancialinformation tothe
Girardis, butshe failed to do so.112 She also closed a bank ac-
count from which she had written a depositcheck before the
Girardiscashedit.113 Substantialevidenceexistedofsimilarsitua-
tionsin which thedebtorhad entered intopurchaseagreem ents
butfailed toclosethem.114 Shelacked thefinancialresourcesto
purchasethehomeswhen sheentered intotheseagreem ents.115
Even so, the court denied the Girardis request for nondischarge-
ability of their claim against the debtor, noting that [w]hile 
therewould seem littledoubtthatundertherightcircumstances,
109 In addition to the cases discussed herein, see the recent cases of
PioneerConst., Inc. v. May(In re May), 518 B.R. 99, 12425 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 
2014)and WeatherallRadiation Oncology v. Caletri(In re Caletri), 517 B.R.
655, 663 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2014), both ofwhich recognize the possibility of
contract-based nondischargeability under§ 523(a)(6). In a post-Geiger deci-
sion, theBankruptcyCourtfortheWestern DistrictofMissouriconsidered a
casein which thedebtorengaged in allegedlywillfuland maliciousinjury in
connection with a repossession ofcollateral. Bank ofIberia v. Jeffries(In re
Jeffries), 378 B.R. 248, 251 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007). Whilenotdiscussingthe
tort of conversion, the debtors conduct in that case m ight have risen to the 
levelofa tort. The debtorborrowed money to purchase a truck, giving the
lendera purchase-m oneysecurity interestin thetruck. Id. When thedebtor
failed tomakepaymentson thetruck, thelenderrepossessed the truck. Id.
However, the debtorredeemed the truck from the lenderand regained pos-
session ofit. Id. Thereafter, thedebtorfiledforbankruptcyprotection, andthe
lendersuccessfullymotionedthebankruptcycourtforrelieffrom theautomatic
stay in ordertoagain repossessthetruck. Id. Afterthesecond repossession,
which occurredjustsixmonthsaftertheinitialrepossession, thelendernoted
thatsignificantmodificationshad been madetothetruck, includingremoval
and replacementofseveralparts ofthe truck such thatthe truck was no
longeroperableandhadnegligibleresalevalue. Id. at 25152. Granting non-
dischargeability under § 523(a)(6), the court held that the [d]ebtors conduct 
wastargeted atthe Bank in thatitwascertain to substantially reducethe
value of the Vehicle and harm  its econom ic interest, but did not m ake a 
specificdeterminationofatortviolation. Id. at256.
110 In re Shaffer, 2003 WL 23138445. The Girardi case post-dated the
Fourth Circuits decision in Bower, which required a tortaction asthebasis
fornondischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6). See supra note77.
111 In re Shaffer, 2003 WL 23138445, at*3.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at*5.
115 Id. at*10.
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breachofcontractcan qualifyaswillfulandm aliciousinjury, the
courthas been unable to find a reported decision involving a
breach of contract to purchase property.116 In Rescuecom Corp.
v. Khafaga,117 the courtperm itted nondischargeability without
anyindication ofa tortclaim.118 Thedebtorentered intoa fran-
chise agreementwith Rescuecom, which prohibited him from en-
gagingin anycompetingbusiness.119 In violation ofthecontract,
the debtor created a competing business under his wifes name in 
ordertodocomputerconsultingwork withouthavingtopayRes-
cuecom any franchise royalties.120 The court found that the
debtors egregious behavior in connection with the breach of 
contractsufficedtoestablish nondischargeability.121 Finally, in In
re Marklin,122 a case from the Sixth Circuit,123 the debtors bor-
rowed through a lineofcredit, securingthedebtwith proceedsof
theirforthcoming crops.124 Afterharvesting and selling thecrops,
the debtors kept the proceeds without making any payments
againstthedebtowedandsecuredbythoseproceeds.125 Without
any discussion oftheneed fora tortiousinjury, theBankruptcy
Courtheldthedebtnondischargeableunder§523(a)(6):
Sherman Marklin testified thatheknew heowed themoney
to Farm Credit, he knew the crops served assecurity forthe
debtandthathewastousethecropproceedstorepaytheloan.
Instead, he willfully placed the crop proceeds into his own
bank accountandusedthefundsasiftheywerehisown. The
Marklins intentional actions in using the crop proceeds for 
theirown benefitmeetthestandard fora willfuland malicious
injurytoFarm Credit.126
116 Id.
117 Rescuecom Corp. v. Khafaga (In re Khafaga), 419 B.R. 539 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2009).
118 Id.
119 Id. at543.
120 Id. at 54344. 
121 Id. at552.
122 Farm CreditServs. OfMid-Am., PCA v. Marklin(In re Marklin), 429 B.R.
880 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2010).
123 The Sixth Circuithaspreviously required thecommission ofa tortin
ordertofindnondischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6). See infra notes 8892. 
124 In re Marklin, 429 B.R. at881.
125 Id.
126 Id. at882. The Marklin decision focuses on the debtors intentional 
actions, despite being decided more than a decade after Geiger made clear
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C. Non-Tort and Non-Contract Actions as the Basis for
Nondischargeability Under § 523(a)(6)
While the question ofnondischargeability arises m ost fre-
quently in tortsand contracts, courtshave declared debtsnon-
dischargeable on the basis of the willful and m alicious injury, 
withouta discussion ofwhetherthe action m ustinclude a tort
claim, in othercontexts. Forexam ple, severalbankruptcycourts
dealing with family law matters have denied a debtors discharge 
when the debtor wrongfully and willfully takes maritalassets
from the former spouse.127 Courts have also perm itted nondis-
chargeability forcopyrightinfringementclaim s.128 And, though
thatdebtormustintend theharm, notjusttheaction, tocreatenondischarge-
ability. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 5758 (1998). Though the court 
did not discuss tort causes of action, Marklins actions m ight have constituted 
thetortofconversion becausehetook proceedsnotbelongingtohim and put
them into his own bank account. The tort of conversion includes [t]he wrongful 
possession or disposition of anothers property as if it were ones own. 
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 356 (8th ed. 2004) (defining conversion in Tort & 
crim inal law). 
127 See, e.g., Alessiv. Alessi(In re Alessi), 405 B.R. 65, 6768 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. 2009)(finding willfuland m aliciousinjury under§523(a)(6)when
debtor, ex-wife, failed to pay creditor, ex-husband, the amountdue under
theirdivorceagreementupon saleofjointly-owned property). Fora casedis-
cussingseveralofthesecases, seeKerv. Ker(In re Ker), 365 B.R. 807, 813
15 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007). In many ofthese cases, including Alessi, the
partiesagreed to a distribution ofproperty, essentially creating a contract.
See Alessi, 405 B.R. at 6768. The breach of that agreem ent in a willful and 
maliciousm annersufficesfornondischargeability. Whiletraditionalcontract
principles assume thatcontractualbreaches occurforpurely economicrea-
sons, in familylaw, and particularly in thedivorcearea, itisnotdifficultto
envision contractbreachesthatoccurforreasonsotherthan pure economic
considerations. See Ker, 365 B.R. at815 (outlining factors, including voluntary
unemploymentby debtor, thatindicated willfuland maliciousnature ofin-
jurytoformerwife);see also Hamilton v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 390 B.R.
618 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2008) (finding willfuland malicious injury in ex-
husband-debtors failure to care for ex-wifes horses, as required by divorce
agreement, leadingtodeathofseveralhorses).
128 Stars Edge, Inc. v. Braun (In re Braun), 327 B.R. 447 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
2005)(holding claim for copyright infringementnondischargeable under §
523(a)(6)and noting congressionaldetermination thatdamagesexistwhen-
ever copyrights are infringed in response to debtors argum ent that debt can 
bedischarged duetolack offinding ofan actualinjury tocopyrightholder);
see also EntrepreneurMedia, Inc. v. Smith (In re Smith), No. 00-56559, 2009
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the majority of courts considering unpaid workers compensation 
claimshavepermitteddischargeofthoseclaims, atleastonecourt
hasrecognized thepossibility thatsuch claimsm aybedeclared
nondischargeableifwillfuland maliciousintentin failingtopay
theclaim exists.129 In each oftheseareas, thecourtsfocused on
the willful and malicious injury language of § 523(a)(6), and 
whileinsomecasesatortsuchasconversionorfraudmayco-exist
with theclaim, thecourtneverdiscussed a tortrequirementin
establishingnondischargeability.130
III. DISTINGUISHING TORTS AND CONTRACTS
Distinguishing tortsfrom contractspresentsa challenge be-
causeactionsbasedin contractmaylead totortiousconduct, such
as fraud,131 conversion, or tortious interference with contract.
Yet, theyarelegallydifferentconceptswith differentpolicycon-
siderations.132 Traditionalcontract law seeks to provide each
WL 6058677 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009)(allowing nondischargeability forwillful
violationoftrademark).
129 Leahyv. Collora(In re Leahy), 170 B.R. 10, 1317 (Bankr. D. Me. 1994) 
(pre-Geiger case).
130 See generally In re Leahy, 170 B.R. 10;In re Braun, 327 B.R. 447;In re
Hamilton, 390 B.R. 618.
131 In cases involving fraudulent conduct, however, nondischargeability
under§523(a)(6)neednotbean issuebecausetheBankruptcyCodeprovides
fornondischargeabilityforfrauddebts. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(2012).
132 Morrow v. L.A. GoldschmidtAssocs., Inc., 492 N.E.2d181, 184(Ill. 1986).
Even when partiesfeelcomfortablein thatdistinction, theimportanceofthat
distinctionforthelitigantshasbeennotedbyscholars:
Thelinedrawn between tortand contractrecovery hasmore
than theoreticalandclassificatorysignificance, groundedasit
is in societys understanding of socially acceptable conduct. For 
society asa whole, thedistinctionsarticulatea setofvalues,
whereasforthelitigatingparties, thetheoreticaldividetakes
on immensepracticalmeaningbecauseitdeterminestheavail-
abilityofdamages. ... Despitethisgravesignificancetosociety
andtotheparties, andinthefaceoffrequentdifficultyindistin-
guishingbetweentortandcontractclaim s, courtsandscholars
attempttomaintain thelinetoensurethatcontractingparties
cannotdrag theirclaimsforbreach intotortterritory. ... But
itisnotdifficulttoenvision situationsin which a person suf-
fersboth contractualand tortiousharm s.... [T]hecomplexity
isintroduced only when the wrongsarise (orseem to arise)
from thesameacts.
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partywiththebenefitoftheirbargain;tortlaw seekstoreimburse
victimsand providedisincentivesforwrongdoing. Matching these
purposestothegoalsofthebankruptcysystem shedslighton how
tortandcontractlaw fitintothenondischargeabilityschemeofthe
Bankruptcy Code, butmodificationsto these traditionalremedy
schem es also support expansion ofwhatmightbe included as
nondischargeabledebtsinbankruptcy.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines a tort as a civil wrong, other 
than a breach of contract, leaving the definition of a contract 
breach asthe criticaldeterm ination ofwhethera tortexists.133
Blacks defines a breach of contract, then, as the [v]iolation of a 
contractual obligation by failing to perform ones own promise, by 
repudiating it, or by interfering with another partys perfor-
mance.134 Thus, apartywhofailstoperform orwhocausesanother
notto perform breaches a contract;other civilwrongs generally
qualify astorts. Butbeyond the legaldistinction between torts
and contracts lies another distinction the policy behind varying 
damagesinherentineach causeofaction.
Tort law seeks to vindicate social policy;135 contractlaw seeks
toensureanon-breachingpartythebenefitofthebargain.136 Con-
tractlaw generallyassumesthatapartywhobreachesacontract
doessoforeconomicreasonsbecauseitcostslesstobreachthecon-
tractthantocom plywithit.137 Thisensurescommercialefficiency
Catherine PaskoffChang, Two Wrongs Can Make Two Rights: Why Courts
Should Allow Tortious Recovery for Intentional Concealment of Contract Breach,
39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 47, 5557 (Fall 2005). 
133 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1626 (9thed. 2009).
134 Id. at213.
135 Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 45960 
(Cal. 1994) ([C]ontract law exists to enforce legally binding agreements between 
parties; tort law is designed to vindicate social policy.). 
136 Demczykv. MutualLifeIns. Co. ofN.Y. (In re Graham Square, Inc.), 126
F.3d 823, 82829 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing the difference between contract 
remediesandtortremedies).
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 1, reporters note 
(1979). TheRestatementofContractsdiscussesremediesavailabletothenon-
breachingpartytothecontractbydiscussingthereasonswhyapartychooses
tobreachacontract:
A contract that he once thought would be profitable may
thereforebecomeunprofitable forhim. Ifthecontractisstill
profitablefortheotherparty, however, aquestion arisesasto
whetherthereluctantparty should becompelled toperform.
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byallowingcontractstofulfillthefunction ofputtingsomething
into the hands of the person who values it most highly while not 
disadvantagingpartieswhoentered intocontractsthatwerelater
deemednotsufficientlyvaluableforcompliance.138 Whileitiseasy
to envision a situation in which a contractbreach isintended,
thebreachingpartygenerallyhasnointention toharm thenon-
breachingpartyand, indeed, m ayhave no intention benevolent 
or ill toward the other party at all. 
The Bankruptcy Codes treatment of claims mirrors som e of 
thesepolicy considerations. Theallowanceofclaims, likecontract
law, givesa rem edy to the non-breaching party by giving that
partya chanceatrepaymentthrough thebankruptcyclaim and
payment processes.139 Nondischargeability under §523 ofthe
Theanswerprovidedbyatleastsomeeconomicanalysistendsto
confirm thetraditionalresponseofcommon-law judgesin deal-
ingwiththisquestion.
Id. The traditionalgoalofthe law ofcontractremedies has notbeen com-
pulsion ofthe promisor to perform his promise, but compensation ofthe
promisee for the loss resulting from  the breach. Willful breaches have not 
been distinguished from other breaches, punitive damages have not been
awarded forbreach ofcontract, and specificperformancehasnotbeen granted
where compensation in damages is an adequate substitute for the injured
party. In general, therefore, a party may find it advantageous to refuse to
perform a contractifhe willstillhave a netgain after he has fully com-
pensatedtheinjuredpartyfortheresultingloss.
Thistraditionalresponseisnotwithoutitsshortcomings. Itsfocuson the
pecuniaryaspectsofbreach failstotakeaccountofnotionsofthesanctityof
contract and the resulting moralobligation to honor ones prom ises. The 
analysisofbreach ofcontractin purelyeconomictermsassumesan abilityto
measurevaluewith a certainty thatisnotoften possiblein thejudicialpro-
cess. The analysis also ignores the transaction costs inherent in the bar-
gaining processand in theresolution ofdisputes, a defectthatisespecially
significantwheretheamountincontroversyissmall. Id.
138 Id. (A bargain from  which both parties benefit results in a gain in 
economic efficiency by moving the exchanged assets to higher valued uses. 
Economictheoryassumesthatthepartiestoan agreementstrivetomaximize
theirown welfareand that, absentsomeimpedimentsuch asmistake, misrep-
resentation, or duress, each party places a value on the others perform ance 
that is greater than the anticipated cost to him  of his own perform ance.). 
139 Itisrarethata claim willbepaid in fullin a bankruptcy proceeding.
Indeed, most individual Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings are no asset cases, in 
which the creditors willreceive no payout on their claims. UNITED STATES
COURTS, CHAPTER 7  BANKRUPTCY BASICS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services
-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics [http:/perma
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Bankruptcy Code serves the sam e goal as tort law furthering 
socialpolicybyprotectingcreditorswhowereparticularlywronged
orprotectingcreditorsdeemedm ostworthyofadditionalprotec-
tions.140 Furthermore, §523(a)(6)andintentionaltortlaw specif-
ically look atthem otiveofthewrongdoer, which statecontract
law generallyrefusestodo.141 Whilethoseparallelssuggestthat
§523(a)(6)nondischargeabilityshouldnotbeextendedtothetypi-
caleconomically motivated breach ofcontract,142 looking atthe
levelsofintentwithintortlaw, aswellasthewillingnesstoextend
punitivedam agestobreach ofcontractactions, suggeststhatin
extraordinary circum stances nondischargeability should apply
in intentionalbreachofcontractsituations.
A. Levels of Intent
Them odern understanding ofintentionaltortsincludeslan-
guage similar to that of § 523(a)(6), referring to frauds, or mali-
cious or willful injuries.143 Tortlaw considersvariouslevelsof
.cc/7AEV-YVPM]. However, even a statelaw contractclaim isnotaguaranty
ofpayment, butarighttoseekthatpayment.
140 Hon. Bernice B. Donald & Kenneth J. Cooper, Collateral Estoppel In
Section 523(C) Dischargeability Proceedings: When Is A Default Judgment
Actually Litigated?, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 32324 (1996) (noting dual 
policiesofprotectingparticularcreditorsandpreventingdebtorwrongdoing).
141 Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton SaudiArabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 461
(Cal. 1994) (In an intentional tort action, motives amounting to malice, oppres-
sion, orfraudmayjustifypunitivedamages. ... Butthelaw generallydoesnot
distinguish between good and bad m otives for breaching a contract.). 
142 Mostofthe nondischargeability provisions consider tort-like actions.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (fraud); § 523(a)(4), (a)(11) (fiduciary fraud or 
defalcation); § 523(a)(9) (personal injury resulting from  driving under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs);§ 523(a)(19) (fraud in securities trading).
However, severalnondischargeability provisions may apply in the contract
setting. See 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(2012)(permittingnondischargeabilityalso
forcreditreceived on basisoffalserepresentationsorexcessiveconsumerdebt
owed toonecreditorand incurred shortly beforebankruptcy filing);§523(a)(3)
(permitting nondischargeability for debts not included in the bankruptcy
schedules);§ 523 (a)(16)(permitting nondischargeability forfee due to home-
owners or sim ilar associations); § 523(a)(18) (permitting nondischargeability 
for repayment to certain pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other plan[s]). 
143 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a
General Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 478 (1990)
(citingOliverW. Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 653 (1872
73)). Despitethesimilarityin language, however, ProfessorVandeveldenotes
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mentalculpability, includingintent, recklessness, andnegligence.144
A tortfeasoractswith intentwhen heorsheactseitherforthe
purposeofcausingtheconsequenceor with substantialcertainty
thatsuch a consequence willoccurasa resultofthe action.145
Buttortlaw alsorecognizesadifferencebetween onewhoseintent
istoharm and onewhoseintentistoactin spiteofthenatural
consequencesofthataction:
Thereareobviousdifferencesbetween theactorwhoacts
with the desire to cause harm and the actorwho engagesin
conductknowing thatharm is substantially certain to hap-
pen. There is a clear element of wrongfulness in conduct
whoseverypurposeistocauseharm. Whiletherearecircum-
stancesin which actingin such awayisappropriate, tortlaw
can fashion affirm ative defenses (such as necessity and de-
fense ofselfand ofproperty)thattake those circumstances
into account. Whetherthe objective oftortlaw isfairnessor
deterrence orsome combination ofthe two, liability forpur-
posefulharmsisgenerallyeasytojustify.
Whentheactorchoosestoengageinconductwithknowledge
thatharm iscertain tofollow, thischoice, with itsknown con-
sequence, providesadistinctiveargumentin favorofliability.
Nevertheless, therearecomplicationsinconsideringtheliability
implicationsofharmsthatare intentionalonly in the sense
thatthe actor who engages in conductknows thatharm is
substantiallycertain toresult. Not only does the actor not desire
to produce the harmful result, but the actor may be engaging
in a generally proper activity for generally proper reasons, even
though the activity produces harm as an unavoidable but un-
wanted byproduct. This can provide an element of justification
or reasonableness that is lacking for purposeful harms.146
In thetortcontext, knowledgeofthelikelihoodofharm arising
from an action satisfies the definition of intent because even if 
theactordidnotdesirethattheharm occur, theactorknew itwas
substantially likely tooccurasa resultoftheaction.147 Butan
issue rem ainsasto whetherthissatisfiesthe Geiger definition
that Holm ess intentional torts differed from  m odern intentional torts and in 
some cases, liability was imposed when public policy so required, not because of 
the m oral shortcom ing of the tortfeasor. Thus, intentional torts were based 
lessin theintentofthetortfeasor. Id.
144 RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TORTS:PHYS. & EMOT. HARM §§ 13 (2010). 
145 Id. §1, §8A (2010).
146 Id. §1 cmt. a(2010)(emphasisadded).
147 Id. §1 (2010).
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fornondischargeability.148 Arguably, because substantiallikeli-
hoodqualifiesasintent, thesubstantiallikelihoodofharm equates
tointenttoharm. Yettheactorm aylack adesire toinflictharm
upon theotherparty, evenifheorsheknowsitwilllikelyoccur.
The Supreme Courtconsidered levelsofintentin a slightly
differentcontext,149 thedefalcation exception todischargeunder
§ 523(a)(4).150 The case involved the debtors role as trustee of 
his fathers trust assets.151 The Suprem e Courtconsidered the
levelofintentrequired tocom m itnondischargeabledefalcation,
concluding that defalcation requires an intentional wrong.152
The Court further defined such intent to include   not only 
conductthatthe fiduciary knowsisim properbutalso reckless
conduct including situations in which the fiduciary consciously 
disregards   a substantial and unjustifiable risk.153 Whilethe
decision focuses on the defalcation exception to discharge, the
Courtconsidered the standard applicable to anotherdischarge
exception fraud in crafting its standard.154 In doing so, the
Courtindicated thatintentincludessituationsin which theac-
torknowingly causesharm ordoessowithoutregard orjustifi-
cation fortherisksassociatedwith theaction.155 But, unlikethe
otherfraudexceptions, §523(a)(6)requires more than just intent
italsorequiresm alice.156 Thus, whileknowledgeoftherisk may
suffice to establish som e requirements of § 523(a)(6) nondis-
chargeability, itcannotbetheendoftheanalysis.
In acasedecidedthesam eyearastheGeiger decision,157 the
Fifth CircuitCourtofAppealsconsidered nondischargeability for
148 Guerra& MooreLtd. v. Cantu (In re Cantu), 389 F. Appx 342, 345 (5th 
Cir. 2010);Carrillov. SU (In re SU), 290 F.3d1140, 1144(9th Cir. 2002);Miller
v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d598, 603 (5thCir. 1998).
149 Bullockv. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1756 (2013).
150 Section 523(a)(4)prohibitsdischarge of debts incurred through fraud 
or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). 
151 Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at1757.
152 Id. at1759.
153 Id. (citingMODEL PENAL CODE §2.02 cm t. 9).
154 Id. (citing11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)). TheCourtlaternotedthatthedefalcation
exception falls within the same setofpolicy considerations as other fault-
based exceptions, including thewillfuland maliciousinjury exception. Id. at
1761 (citing11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(6), and(a)(9)).
155 MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02(2)(b).
156 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6).
157 Millerv. J.D. AbramsInc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d598, 598 (5thCir. 1998).
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an intentionaltortunder § 523(a)(6).158 Debtor-defendantdis-
closed tradesecretsofhisform eremployerin ordertosecurea
position with a competing firm.159 Misappropriation ofsuch in-
formation clearlyconstituted an intentionaltort, butthequestion
remainedofwhethertheintentionaltortsufficedfornondischarge-
abilityinbankruptcy.160 TheAppellateCourtremandedforafind-
ingon theintentionalandmaliciousinjuryrequirements.161 In so
doing, the courtconsidered num erous potentialinterpretations
of the willful and malicious injury standard: The standard might 
bemetby any tortgenerally classified asan intentionaltort, by
anytortsubstantiallycertain toresultin injury, oranytortmoti-
vated by a desire to inflict injury.162 In rejectingthefirstoption,
therequirementofan intentionaltort, thecourtnotedthatsuch
an interpretation could be both over- and under-inclusive, as
some intentionaltorts are not malicious, and som e m alicious
injuries are notintentionaltorts.163 In addition to intent, the
creditor must also establish the malicious injury requirement of 
§523(a)(6).164 Afteralengthydiscussion ofim plied versusactual
malice, thecourtsettled on a definition ofmalicethatborrowed
from the First and Fifth Circuits definitions of m alice, requiring 
either a lack of just cause or excuse165 forthetortiousbehavior
or knowing disregard of the rights of another.166 Asthe court
noted, this definition ofm alice focuses on similar elements to
the definition ofintentionaltortthatthecourthad already laid
158 Id. at601.
159 Id. at 60001. 
160 Id. at603.
161 Id. at598.
162 Id. at603.
163 Id. at 60304. Nonetheless, the court conceded that in m ost cases, an 
intentional tort would suffice as a proxy for willful and m alicious injury 
under § 523(a)(6), stating [m]ost often, an intentional tort requires either ob-
jectivesubstantialcertaintyofharm orsubjectivemotivetodoharm. Indeed,
thepresenceofoneofthesefactorsisboth necessaryand sufficientforatort
to be classified as an intentional tort under the traditional modern definition. 
164 Id. at604. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6).
165 This m irrors the Supreme Courts just cause or excuse standard for 
§523(a)(6), asstatedin Tinkerv. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 486 (1903). See supra
note38 andaccompanyingtext.
166 Miller, 156 F.3d at605 (citing In re Nance, 556 F.2d 602, 611 (1stCir.
1977)(internalquotation marksomitted)).
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out: objective substantial certainty of harm or subjective m otive 
to do harm .167 Othercircuitshavefollowedsuitin definingmal-
ice to indicate behaviorthatislikely to harm anotherwithout
justcause.168
The ability to use just cause in defense ofan intentional
harm even an intentional tort is not a new concept in legal 
doctrine. ProfessorKenneth Vandeveldediscussed theoriginsof
theideain hisoft-citedpiece, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The
Origins of a General Theory of Intentional Tort:
In analyzing the lawfulness of the defendants conduct, 
Lord Bowen began with this principle: [I]ntentionally to do 
thatwhich is calculated in the ordinary course ofevents to
damage, and which does, in fact, damageanotherin thatother
persons property or trade, is actionable if done without just 
cause or excuse. Lord Bowen concluded, however, that the de-
fendants intentional infliction of injury to the plaintiffs trade 
was justified by the defendants commercial motive of advancing 
theirowntrade, and, therefore, defendantswerenotliable.
Seven years after Pollocks treatise appeared, Holm es ar-
ticulated ageneraltheoryofintentionaltortin his1894article,
Privilege, Malice, and Intent. Holm es wrote that the inten-
tionalinfliction oftemporaldamage, or the doing ofan act
manifestlylikelytoinflictsuch damageandinflictingit, isac-
tionable if done without just cause.169
Thejustcausetestadopted bytheFifth Circuitfitswith the
Geiger courts distinction between intent to act and intent of the 
consequencesofthatactasan elem entofm aliceby focusingon
whythetortfeasoracted in spiteofknown consequences, and of
the tortfeasors intent regarding the consequences ofthat ac-
tion.170 It also furthers the without just cause standard of the 
Supreme Courts Tinker decision,171 and mirrors the standard
167 Miller, 156 F.3dat605.
168 Maxfield v. Jennings(In re Jennings), 670 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir.
2012)(citingHopev. Walker(In re Walker), 48 F.3d1161, 1164(11thCir. 1995));
see, e.g., Jettv. Sicroff(In re Sicroff), 401 F.3d1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2005). But
cf. Miller, 156 F.3d at605 (arguingthattheGeiger court displaced the just 
causestandardespousedbyTinker).
169 Vandevelde, supra note 143, at473 (quoting MogulSteam ship Co. v.
McGregor, Gow, & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (1889), affd by [1892]App. Cas.
25);Walkerv. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871).
170 Kawaauhauv. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 58 (1998).
171 193 U.S. 473 (1904). See supra text accompanying notes 3339. 
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already applied by theSupremeCourtfordefalcation claims.172
Applying this standard in the tortcontextwould prohibitdis-
chargeofadebtunder§523(a)(6)insituationsin which thetort-
feasor acted with the purpose ofharm ing the victim or with
knowledge thatthe actwould likely cause harm , and without
justificationforactinginsuch am anner.
Thisstandardcouldalsobeappliedin thecontextofabreach
ofcontract claim . Applying tort levels ofintent, parties often
breach contractsintentionally, perhapseven with knowledge of
the likely harm to the non-breaching party.173 Im agine, forex-
ample, asim plecontracttoshipgoodsfrom onestatetoanother.
Ifthepartyproducingthegoodssuddenlyfindsalessexpensive
way to transportits goods and chooses to breach the shipping
agreement, the breaching party knowsithaschosen to breach
the contract. It likely understands that as a result, the non-
breachingshippingcom panywillhaveunused capacityin oneof
itsshipping vesselsthatitcould otherwise have filled with an-
other customers goods. Indeed, contracts frequently provide that 
each party recognizestheeconomicharm thatwilloccurin the
eventofa breach and agrees to the dam ages to be paid upon
breach.174 This clearly satisfies the tortdefinition ofintentbe-
causethebreaching party understandsthesubstantiallikelihood
ofharm . However, unlike many tort scenarios, the breaching
party could argue just cause for breaching the contract, as this 
isa classicefficientbreach designed to ensure an effective eco-
nomicsystem.175 Thus, whileintentional, thebreach wouldnotbe
malicious. In the rare instance ofa contractbreach where the
standardofintentismetandnojustification existsforthebreach
172 Bullockv. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754(2013).
173 See, e.g., KoreaSupplyCo. v. LockheedMartin Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d
29, 54(Cal. 2003);Lam a HoldingCo. v. Smith BarneyInc., 646 N.Y.S.2d 76,
79, 82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996);Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton SaudiArabia
Ltd., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d475, 476 (Cal. 1994).
174 See, e.g., 24WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§65.33, 65.5 (4th ed. 2014)(dis-
cussingliquidateddamagesprovisions).
175 Asone case noted, the Bankruptcy Code invitesdebtorsto efficiently
breach contractspost-petition through theexecutorycontractprovisionsof11
U.S.C. §365, and thustodenydischargetoadebtorwhoefficientlybreached
pre-petition would seem unjust. Lockerby v. Sierra, 535 F.3d 1038, 104243 
(9thCir. 2008).
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(e.g., thebreachisnotefficientbycommerciallaw standards), the
breachingpartysatisfiestheelementofmalicesuch thatthedebt
shouldnotbedischargeable.
B. Punitive Damages176
Thepossibility ofextending nondischargeability tobreach of
contractclaimsin thecontextofunjustified intentionalcontract
breachesfindssupportin thegrowingtrendofallowingpunitive
damagesforbreach ofcontractclaim s.177 While§523(a)(6)does
notmention punitivedamages,178 thehistoryandpurposeofpuni-
tivedamagesatstatelaw179 parallelthehistory and purposeof
nondischargeabilityundertheBankruptcyCode.180 Differentstate
176 RESTATEMENT (FIRST)OF CONTRACTS ch. 12, topic2, §342 cm t. A:
Damages are punitive when they are assessed by way of
punishmenttothewrongdoerorexampletoothersand notas
themoney equivalentofharm done. Alldamagesarein some
degreepunitiveandpreventive;buttheyarenotsocalledunless
theyexceedjustcompensationmeasuredbytheharm suffered.
177 MichaelL. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and
Further Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15, 2021 (1998). 
178 TheSupremeCourthas, however, tied punitivedamagesto§523(a)(6)
nondischargeability. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991). See supra
note44.
179 While state law determ ines the existence ofmosttortand contract
claimsand thedamagesawarded forthem, theSupremeCourthasrecognized
thatstate law doesnotcontrolthe question ofnondischargeability. Grogan,
498 U.S. at 28384 (The validity of a creditors claim is determined by rules 
ofstatelaw. ... [T]heissueofnondischargeabilityhasbeen amatteroffederal
law governed by the term s of the Bankruptcy Code.) (citing Vanston 
BondholdersProtectiveComm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946));Brown v.
Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 12930 (1979). Even so, the Court has also looked to 
statelaw in determining thestandardsfordischargeability. Specifically, the
Courthasheld thatthestandard forestablishing nondischargeability under
§ 523(a)(2)s fraud exception includes the lower standard of preponderance of 
the evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence to ensure that those 
able to establish fraud under state law could enjoy the benefits ofnondis-
chargeability in thebankruptcy system. Grogan, 498 U.S. at285, 287. Thus,
whilefederallaw establishedthestandardfornondischargeabilityofdebt, state
law determined the existence ofthe underlying fraud debt. Cf. Archer v.
Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003)(allowing nondischargeability offraud claim
under§523(a)(2)ifplaintiffestablishedexistenceoffraudeven though claim
couldnolongerbepursuedunderstatelaw duetothesettlementagreement).
180 CharlesJordanTabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States,
3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995)(discussingthehistoryand development
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standardsexistastowhatactionssufficeforan awardofpunitive
dam ages, butin each, punitivedamagesseek topunish extreme
wrongdoing beyond the traditional negligence cause of action.181
Punitivedamagescannotserveasaproxyfornondischargeability
becausetherequirem entstoim posepunitivedamagesvaryfrom
statetostateand sometimesdifferfrom theGeiger requirements
for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6).182 Nonetheless, the
ofbankruptcylawsin theeighteenth and nineteenth centuriesin theUnited
States);Lauren A. Helbling& ChristopherM. Klein, The Emerging Harmless
Innocent Omission Defense to Nondischargeability Under Bankruptcy Code
§ 523(a)(3)(A): Making Sense of the Confusion Over Reopening Cases and
Amending Schedules to Add Omitted Dates, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 33 (1995).
181 ToppsCo. v. CadburyStani, S.A.I.C., 380 F. Supp. 2d 250, 261 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (noting that punitive dam ages exist to punish the defendant and to 
deter future egregious conduct). 
182 Duncan v. Duncan (In re Duncan), 448 F.3d 725, 72829 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(rejecting the argument that a punitive damage judgment in a wrongful
death action collaterally estopped debtorfrom arguing fordischargeofdebt
because state law allowed punitive damagesforrecklessbehavior, which is
notsufficientfornondischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6)). See also Collins Entmt 
Corp. v. Coatsand CoatsRentalAmusement, 577 S.E. 2d 237, 243 (4th Cir.
2003) (noting that South Carolina allows punitive dam ages for willful ... or 
m alicious conduct). In the Collins Entertainment case, the courtrelied in
part on the breaching partys realization thatthecontractbreach would lead
to a serious economic loss and the fact that such a breach would take revenue 
from thenon-breachingpartyand giveittothebreachingpartyinstead. 577
S.E.2d at244. UndertheGeiger standard, mereintention tobreach without
intentto cause harm by the breach would notsuffice foran award ofnon-
dischargeability and, thus, the Collins standard for punitive damages may
allow such damages in situations that the Geiger standard would deem
insufficientforanondischargeabilitydetermination. Even so, somecourtsdo
look atthe ability to receive punitive damages in determining nondischarge-
ability. See, e.g., Higginsv. Olson (In re Olson), 32 F. Appx 194 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(holding thatfailure to award punitive damagesdoesnotequate to finding
thatnowillfulandmaliciousinjuryoccurred);Siemerv. Nangle(In re Nangle),
274 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 2001)(allowing jury decision to award punitive
dam agestocollaterally estop debtorfrom arguing fordischargeofdebt). See
also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-206 (West2015), which provides forpunitive
dam ages when the tortfeasor acted (1) with m alice or in reckless disregard of 
the consequences, from which m alice m ay be inferred, or (2) intending to cause 
injury;FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (West2015), which requires only that the
debtor knew ofor was recklessly indifferentto the risks ofhis or her in-
tentionalbehavior;KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184 (West1988)(permitting
punitive dam ages in cases involving oppression, fraud, or malice); N.J. STAT.
ANN. 2A:15-5.12 (West 2015) (requiring malice or wanton and willful dis-
regard to establish punitive damages claim, but allowing negligence action to 
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parallelsbetween thejurisprudenceofpunitivedam agesandthe
jurisprudence ofnondischargeability for willful and malicious
actionsprovidesinsightintowhetherwillful and malicious non-
dischargeabilityactionscouldincludestate-law contractactions.
Historically, only tortactionsjustify punitivedamages,183 and
thelaw usespunitivedamagestopunish them ostegregiousof
tortfeasors.184 Reasons for denialofpunitive damages in con-
tractactionsincludetheeaseofdeterm ining actualdamagesin
contract actions, the unlikelihood of contract actions causing
physical harm or m ental anguish, and the desire to allow even 
encourage com mercially efficient breaches of contract.185 How-
ever, contractactionsincreasinglyserveasthebasisforpunitive
damage claim s when the court finds such wrongdoing in the
contractaction itselftojustifyassessingpunitivedamagesdespite
thelackofatortcauseofaction.186
Thetraditionalruledisallowingpunitivedamagesin contract
actionsstem sfrom thepolicydifferencesbetween tortsand con-
tracts themselves. Unlike contracts, torts arise from an often-
involuntaryrelationshipbetween twoorm oreparties, whereone
serveasbasisforpunitivedamagesclaim). But see MINN. STAT. ANN. §549.20
(West 2015) (requiring findings of deliberate disregard for others that evoke 
elementsofboth intentand Geiger-typemalicetoestablish punitivedamages).
See also Martinez, supra note 70, at 45859 (2009). 
183 Demczykv. MutualLiveIns. Co. ofN.Y. (In re Graham Square, Inc.), 126
F.3d 823, 82829 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing the difference between contract 
remediesandtortremedies).
184RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS §901 (citingthreereasonsforawarding
tort damages: compensation to determine rights, punishment, and vindication); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS §903 cmt. a(indicatingthatcompensatory
dam agesaretoputthevictim in thefinancialposition thatheorshewould
have been in had the tortnotoccurred);RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS
§ 908 (indicating that punitive damages punish [the tortfeasor] for his outra-
geous conduct or because of his evil m otive or his reckless indifference). 
185 Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985)
(denying punitive damages for dam age resulting from failure to properly
storecargoonboardshippercontractrequirements). See Steven Shavell, Why
Breach of Contract May Not be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts,
107 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (2009);Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract be
Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551 (2009)(togetherdebatingwhethercontract
obligations can equate to moralobligations such thatbreaches ofcontract
mayserveasabasisforpunitivedamageandothermorality-basedactions).
186 Steven W. Feldman, Autonomy and Accountability in the Law of Con-
tracts: A Response to Professor Shiffrin, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 177, 21114 (2009). 
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ofthepartiessuffersharm atthehandsoftheother.187 Tortlaw
reflects social mores, and vindicate[s] social policy.188 In con-
trast, contractsreflectan agreementbetween twoormoreparties,
wherebythepartieshavetheopportunitytodefinetheparam e-
tersoftheirrelationship, and thedamagesthatresultfrom fail-
ingtomeettherequirementsofthecontract. Contractlaw focuses
on whatthepartiestothecontractanticipated, andservesonlyto
putthepartiesintothefinancialpositionthatthepartiesexpected
toresultfrom thecontract.189 Thereasonswhya partyfailed to
meetitsobligationshavenobearing on thecalculation ofdam-
agesbecausethedamageswillensurethatthepartysufferingloss
from the breach receivesallthatthe party anticipated from the
contract.190 Indeed, underthistraditionalrule, thenon-breaching
party only collects the contracted-for damages, even againsta
partywhowillfullyandegregiouslybreachesacontract.191
Casesprohibiting punitivedamagesin contractactionsnote
thatnon-breaching partiesto a contractmay obtain compensa-
tory damagesdesigned tomakethem whole, asifa breach had
neveroccurred. Thesedamagesmay takemany forms,192 butto
permitpunitive dam ages in addition to the contract damages
187 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS §281 (1965).
188 Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 45960 
(Cal. 1994).
189 Id. at460.
190 Id. at 461 (In an intentional tort action, motives am ounting to m alice, 
oppression, orfraud may justify punitivedamages. ... Butthelaw generally
does not distinguish between good and bad motives for breaching a contract.). 
However, manystatesrecognizeatortof bad faith ... refusal to pay a claim 
when insurance companies fail to pay claims in bad faith. See John H.
Bauman, Emotional Distress Damages and the Tort of Insurance Bad Faith,
46 DRAKE L. REV. 717, 739 (1998).
191 A.L. CarterLum berCo. v. Saide, 168 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1943)(re-
versingajuryaward ofpunitivedamagesin a breach ofcontractaction, and
noting that punitive damages may not be awarded for breach ofcontract
even though the breach is brought about capriciously and with m alice); Fed. 
FireProt. Corp. v. J.A. Jones/TompkinsBuilders, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d87, 91
(D.D.C. 2003)(allowingpunitivedamagesclaim forrelated conversion claim,
but noting that punitive dam ages are notrecoverablein abreach ofcontract
action m erely because the defendant breached in bad faith). 
192 Topps Co. v. Cadbury StaniS.A.I.C., 380 F. Supp. 2d 250, 261 n.11
(S.D.N.Y. 2005)(discussing restitution, reliance, and expectancy damagesas
compensatorydamagesin contractactions).
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runs the risk of making the non-breaching party more than
whole.193 In 1985, the Eighth CircuitCourtofAppeals consid-
ered punitive damages for a breach of contract action.194 In
denyingpunitivedamages, theEighth Circuitrelied on thelack
ofa tortaction arising from thebreach ofcontractfacts.195 The
DistrictCourtfortheNorthern DistrictofIllinoisalsorestricted
a plaintiffs ability to tether a tortclaim toa contractclaim and
thusreceivea punitivedamagesaward when thenon-breaching
partysuffersonlymonetarydam ages.196 In itsdecision, theDis-
trictCourtfocused on the connection between economic harm
inherentin contractlaw andlackofpunitivedamages:
Illinoisdoesrecognizethatiftheconductcomplained ofrises
tothelevelofan independenttort, forwhich punitivedamag-
esmay be sought, plaintiffmay sustain claim sforboth that
tortand a breach ofcontracton thesamefacts. ... Thereisa
limitation, however, in that, generally, if plaintiffs damages 
arepurely economicin nature, itcannotmaintain a claim in
tortbased on breach ofcontractfacts. ... Economiclossexists
where the defect is of a qualitative nature and the harm  re-
lates to the consum ers expectation that a product is of a par-
ticular quality so that it is fit for ordinary use.197
Thesecasesexemplify thetraditionalrulethatbreach ofcontract
damagescannotincludepunitivedam ages.
In somecases, however, theexistenceofmaliciousbehaviorin
connection with abreach turnswhatwould otherwiseconstitute
193 Id. at 261 (noting that punitive dam ages would put the non-breaching 
partyin abetterfinancialposition than theywouldhaveoccupiedbutforthe
breach). 
194 DeltaRiceMill, Inc. v. Gen. FoodsCorp., 763 F.2d1001 (8thCir. 1985).
195 Delta Rice contracted to sellrice to GeneralFoods. GeneralFoods
rejectedalargeshipmentofriceand, though itclaimedtodosoasaresultof
the quality ofthe rice, and because thepriceofrice had decreased between
thetimeofcontractand thetimeofrejection. Delta Ricesuggested General
Foodss rationale for breach sim ply m asked the true reason for the breach a 
financialdecision topurchasethericeelsewhereatalowerprice. Id. at1003.
In rejecting the punitive damages claim, the Eighth Circuit noted the
existence of two tort actions based solely on breach of contract bad faith 
refusal to pay and m isperform ance of a contract that, if shown, m ight 
sufficeforpunitivedamageclaims. Id. at1005.
196 BP AmocoChem. v. FlintHillsRes., LLC, 489 F. Supp. 2d853 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
197 Id. at857 (citationsomitted).
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a contractaction into a tort-like action, which m ay then allow
for punitive damages.198 In American Bank of Waco v. Waco
Airmotive, Inc., Wacotook outasmallbusinessloan from Amer-
ican Bank.199 When Wacofailedtom akeaseriesofpaymentson
the loan, the bank offset the amount due against Wacos account 
balanceatthebank topaytheloan.200 Attrial, Wacoobtained a
judgmentasa resultofa wrongfuloffset, which included exem-
plary damages for the banks willful, wanton or m alicious ac-
tion.201 TheTexasSuprem eCourtstartedfrom thepremisethat,
becausethecauseofaction stemmed from theaccountagreement
between theparties, thepresumption againstpunitivedamages
in contract actions applied.202 However, after considering the
banks actions in the offset, the court concluded that a finding 
thatabankactedwithmaliceorinrecklessdisregardoftherights
ofitsdepositorwillsupporta depositors recovery of exemplary 
damages for wrongful dishonor of its checks ....203 In essence,
thecourtfound theexistenceofatort-likeaction thatsupported
punitive damages by finding a contractbreach plus m alice or
recklessdisregardfortherightsofthenon-breachingparty.204
Contractsscholars recognize a fundam entalshiftin the ap-
proach ofcourtstocontractdamages, infusingnotionsofmorality
andgoodfaith intocontractinterpretation.205 Thistransformation
198 In atleastonejurisdiction, a publicinteresthasalsobeen required in
ordertoassesspunitivedamagesin connection with acontractbreach. Topps
Co., 380 F. Supp. 2d at255 (denying claim forpunitive damagesexceptfor
misappropriation of trade secret claim because New York only allows
punitive dam ages on contract claim s when defendant engage[d] in a pattern 
of activity directed against the general public). 
199 Am. Bank ofWacov. WacoAirmotive, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tex.
App. 1991).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at176.
203 Id.
204 Interestingly, theWaco decision allowsacontractaction toserveasthe
basisforpunitivedamages, buttheFifth Circuitdoesnotallow contractaction
nondischargeabilityunder§523(a)(6). Millerv. J.D. AbramsInc. (In re Miller),
156 F.3d598 (5thCir. 1998), supra notes 15763 and accompanying text. 
205 Feldman, supra note 186, at 183 ([T]he great majority of state and federal 
jurisdictions including the United States Suprem e Court specifically 
expressstrong legaland moraldisapprovalofunexcused, intentionalbreach
of prom ise.). Mr. Feldm an continues: 
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includesa willingnessamongcourtstoassesspunitivedam ages
forcertain breach ofcontractactions, even in the absence ofa
correspondingorindependenttortclaim.206 Italsoincludesargu-
mentsfrom a numberofcontractsscholarsforincreased recogni-
tionofpunitivedamagesforcertainbreachesofcontract.207 Though
scholarsrecognizepunitivedam agesin contractactionsasanew
approach, somecourtshavealreadyrecognizedtheabilityin som e
states to receive punitive damages on contract actions. Judge
Richard Posner penned an opinion in 1998 noting thatIndiana
allowspunitivedamagesforbreach ofcontractactionswhen the
breach ofcontractalsoincludeselements of fraud, malice, gross 
negligence or oppression.208 Whilefraudwouldindependentlycon-
stituteatortaction, JudgePosnerdidnotrequireatortclaim to
establish a basisforpunitive dam ages.209 He refuted thetradi-
tionalnotion thatparties breach contracts for efficiency, rather
thanforillmotives:
After an in-depth analysis ofthe decisions, one scholar has
stated that [t]here has been a slow but steady trend ... to-
wards an application ofhigher standards ofgood faith, fair
dealing and morality to all contracts and transactions. Another 
commentator takes the same position, stating that conven-
tionalrelational, critical, and law and economicsscholarsall
agree that contract law is undergoing a transformation as a 
result of an infusion of communitarian values, such as fairness, 
trust, paternalism , and cooperation. More than ever, it re-
m ains a truism  that [t]he m oral standard that requires indi-
vidualstokeeptheirpromisescertainlyhashadan important
effect on the developm ent of contract law. 
Id. at 18990 (citing Nicola W. Palm ieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required
During Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 120 (1993);
G. Richard Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards for Common Law Rules in
Commercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1198,
1205 (1988);HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS §1:2 (2009)).
206 Id. at 21112 ([A] sharp upsurge has occurred in the number and amount 
ofpunitivedamageawardsin contract cases, which further shows the laws 
receptiveness to this remedy in the interests of justice.) (citing ERIK MOLLER,
TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985, 34(1996);RussellJ. Weintraub,
A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1, 8 n. 28 (1992)).
207 See Chang, supra note 132, at 4950 (arguing that punitive dam ages 
should be granted for egregious breachesofcontract, andthatcourtsshould
bewilling tofind tort-likeconductwhen a party intentionally misrepresents
orbreachescontract).
208 Pattonv. Mid-ContinentSys., Inc., 841 F.2d742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988).
209 Id.
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Notallbreachesofcontractareinvoluntaryorotherwiseeffi-
cient. Someareopportunistic;thepromisorwantsthebenefit
ofthebargain withoutbearing theagreed-upon cost, and ex-
ploitstheinadequaciesofpurely compensatory remedies(the
majorinadequaciesbeing thatpre- and post-judgmentinter-
estratesarefrequently below marketlevelswhen therisk of
nonpaymentistaken intoaccountandthatthewinningparty
cannot recover his attorneys fees). This seems the com mon
elementin mostoftheIndianacasesthathaveallowed puni-
tivedamagestobeawardedinbreachofcontractcases....210
Thus, while a traditional efficient breach of contract would 
notsufficeforpunitivedamages, theoccasionalbreach in which
thebreachingpartysomehow takesadvantageoftheotherparty
andenjoysthebenefitofthebargainwithoutfulfillingitsownpart
ofthecontractforsomething otherthan purely economicreasons
would sufficeforpunitivedamagesin Indiana. In addition, even
in jurisdictions thathave not recognized the ability to obtain
punitivedamagesforcontractbreaches, judgeshavecriticized the
distinction.211 Thiswillingnesstoconsiderpunitivedamagesfor
210 Id. at751.
211 Miller Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Rosen, 485 A.2d 1023, 102728 n.2 (While 
webelievethattheapplication ofan impliedmalicestandard with respectto
allcontract-relatedfraudcasesismeritorious, weareconstrainedbythedoc-
trineofstare decisis tobaseourdecision onbindingprecedentsestablishedby
the Court of Appeals.); id. at1031 (Adkins, J., concurring):
Thedistinction [between puretortclaimsand tortclaim s
tiedtocontractbreaches]seemstobebasedon notionsunder-
lyingthedisallowanceofpunitivedamagesin purecontractac-
tions. Itissuggestedthatconcernforpunitivedamageswillchill
commercial transactions because would-be contracting parties 
willbereluctanttoenterintocontractsthatmightultimately
result in unlim ited liability. ... It is posited that the existence 
ofcontract-related punitivedamagesmightinhibitpartiesto
acontractfrom breachingthecontractin ordertopursuepos-
siblymoreprofitableandeconomicallyefficientventures....
Whatevermeritthese argumentsmay have with respect
to pure contractactions, they arelessthan persuasive when
applied toan action forfraud arising outofa contract. Why
should one who liesorcheatsin connection with the perfor-
manceofa contractescapeliability becauseheismotivated by
greedinsteadofhatefortheothercontractingparty?
Both the majority and concurring opinions in Miller Building suggestthat
the requirementofactualm alice and implied maliceforcontract-based tort
claim sand pure tortclaims, respectively, be merged into an implied m alice
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contractbreachesappearstobearecentdevelopment;in1988, the
FourthCircuitCourtofAppealsnotedthat:
[I]tappearsthatSouth Carolinaistheonlystatein thenation
whichpermitspunitivedamagesforconductwhichdoesnotgive
risetoan independenttortclaim. ... [Though]New Mexicorec-
ognizesaclaim forpunitivedamagesforbreach ofcontractac-
companiedbyafraudulentact, itfurtherrequiresthattheact
be wanton in character and m aliciously intentional.212
Like state tortlaw, nondischargeability underfederalbank-
ruptcy law sharesthegoaltopunish thosewhoactegregiously
by ensuring that only honest debtors enjoy the most significant 
benefitofthe bankruptcy system.213 To the extentthatstates
onlypermittedpunitivedamagesfortortactions, itmadesensefor
federal bankruptcy law to follow suit in the area of nondis-
chargeability.214 Butasstatesincreasinglyallow punitivedamages
in connection with certain breach ofcontractactions, thusindi-
catingthatthosebreachesm eettheegregiousstandard soasto
warrantadditionaldamagesbeyond whatthepartiesdid orcould
havecontractedforaspunishment, federalbankruptcylaw should
alsopermitnondischargeabilityofthosetypesofcontractdamages.
CONCLUSION
Generally, partiesto a contractacceptbankruptcy and non-
paymentasarisk ofbusinessengagem ents.215 Whiletheparties
requirementforallpunitive damage claims. This does notsuggestthatall
contract claim s should be entitled to punitive dam ages just that tort claim s 
with fraudinvolvedshouldbeallowedpunitivedamagesin thesamem anner
asothertortclaim sallowingpunitivedamagestoattach. See also Morrow v.
L.A. GoldschmidtAssocs., 492 N.E.2d 181, 187 (1986)(Goldenhersh, J., dis-
senting) (It is tim e that we acknowledge and excise from  the body of law of 
thisStatetheartificialdistinction [between breach ofcontractand breach of
tort claim s] perpetuated by the m ajority opinion.). 
212 Edensv. GoodyearTire& RubberCo., 858 F.2d 198, 201 n. 2 (4th Cir.
1988)(citing 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 245 (1965);JOHN D. CALAMARI &
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §14-3 (2d ed. 1977);Whitehead
v. Allen, 313 P.2d335, 336 (N.M. 1957)).
213 See supra note17 andaccompanyingtext.
214 See supra note182 andaccompanyingtext.
215 RobertA. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy, 43 STAN. L. REV.
99, 128 (1990) ([T]he law has made a discharge in bankruptcy a foreseeable 
risk of contracting.). 
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are notable to contractaround discharge ofdebt,216 they can
effectivelypreventdischargethrough theuseofcollateralization
tocreatea secured claim.217 Tortlaw, on theotherhand, seeks
to compensate victims often victims who did not have an oppor-
tunitytochoosetoengagewith thetortfeasor.218
Anyconcernsregardingdiscouragingcommercialinteractionby
allowing traditionaltortremedies(likepunitivedamages)in con-
tractactionsposelittleconcern in thenondischargeabilitycontext,
thankstothehigh standard fornondischargeabilityprovided by
the Geiger decision.219 If § 523(a)(6) required only intent even 
intent to cause harm to the non-breaching party alm ost any 
breach ofcontractwouldqualifyfornondischargeabilityifintent
includessubstantialcertainty ofharm . Butthe stringentstan-
dard for a finding of nondischargeability willful and malicious
conduct balances the need to allow efficient breach and a fresh 
start for bankruptcy debtors with traditionaltort concepts of
retribution and punishmentinherentin nondischargeability.220 In
particular, therequirementthatthe debtor lack justification for 
theaction, even ifthataction would likely causeharm, ensures
that those debtors who breach for purely economic reasons a 
justification long accepted under American contracttheory for
breaching a contract would not face nondischargeability for this 
216 Partiescannotavoid dischargethrough a contract, norcan they require,
pre-petition, an agreementthatthedebtwillbereaffirmed in theeventofa
bankruptcy filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(2012)(outlining therequirements
forreaffirmingdebtsin bankruptcycases, includingpost-petition determination
through attorney and/or judge that reaffirmation of debt does present an undue 
hardship for debtor and, in som e cases, is in the debtors best interest). 
217 See, e.g., AmeriCreditFin. Servs. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 636 F.3d
1175, 1176, n.3 (9th Cir. 2011);Wilding v. CitiFinancialConsumerFin. Servs.
(In re Wilding), 475 F.3d428, 430 (1stCir. 2007).
218 Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton SaudiArabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 460
(Cal. 1994).
219 See supra notes 4869 and accom panying text. 
220 Thus, though one court expressed concern that to allow punitive
dam ages for intentional breaches of contract would swallow up the general 
rule denying punitive dam ages for breach of contract, the sam e concern does 
not hold true in nondischargeability because mere intent to breach the
contractwould notsufficefornondischargeabilityundertheGeiger standard
ofmalicethatrequiresintentfortheharm ratherthanintentionalaction. See
Carricov. Delp, 490 N.E.2d972, 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
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decision.221 Thisinterpretation of§523(a)(6)would avoid classify-
ing willful and malicious injury as a tort injury versus a contract 
injury.222 Rather, itfocuseson thecriticalbalanceand purposes
of nondischargeability preventing debtors from discharging 
debts incurred through egregious behavior, while allowing the
debtorafreshstartthrough thedischargeofmostotherdebts.
221 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 5758 (1998). 
222 Id.
